Williams v. Hartford" et al

3:17-cv-02098-KAD

2019 | Cited 0 times | D. Connecticut | January 2, 2019

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT CHARLES C. WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, : :

v. : No. 3:17-CV-2098 (KAD) : HARTFORD, et al. :

Defendants. : December 19, 2018 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DE#s 42, 45) Preliminary Statement of the Case On December 18, 2017, the plaintiff, Charles C. Williams, a prisoner in the pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of Hartford, Hartford Police Detective Cheryl Gogins, and DOC Correction Officer Nancy Quiros. He filed an amended complaint on July 9, 2018. After initial review, the Court, Thompson, J. First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against Gogins and his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim to proceed against Gogins and Quiros. Initial Review Order at 11-13. The Court dismissed the claim against the city of Hartford. Id. at 6. On October 15 and 24, 2018, Gogins and Quiros filed separate motions to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiff filed memoranda in opposition to both motions. For the following reasons, the Gogins Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Quiros Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part. Standard of Review

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly [the] plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendan Id. The plausibility standard is not a probability requirement; the complaint must show, not merely allege, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See id.

LaMagna v. Brown (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). See also Amaker v. New York State

Dept. of Corr. Servs. 011) (same). Accordingly, the Court Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This is true whether the plaintiff has counsel or appears pro se. Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). However, [w]here . . . the complaint was filed pro se Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d

509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Allegations On May 17, 2015, the plaintiff filed a civil rights action against Gogins and the

libel, and other claims stemming from his 2013 arrest for sexual assault and unlawful

restraint. Williams v. Hartford Police Dept., No. 3:15-CV-933 (AWT). The Court, Thompson, J., dismissed that case with prejudice after concluding that the plaintiff had attempted to defraud the Court by deliberately falsifying an exhibit and submitting sworn verifications in support of the false exhibit. Williams, No. 3:15-CV-933, Order No. 456. 1

In 2016, while his first civil rights case was pending in this Court, the plaintiff alleges that Quiros intercepted some of his outgoing legal mail and e-mailed it as an attachment to Gogins. The plaintiff attached to his opposition memoranda a copy of the e-mail exchange between Quiros and Gogins. 2

In the e-mail, dated July 23, 2015, Quiros stated the following to Gogins:

Not sure where the case is right now. But the facility intercepted a letter that I/M Williams tried sending out as legal mail. Please see attached. Please let me know if I should release the letter or hold it for evidence. Gogins responded later that afternoon stating:

Thank you for apprising me of this letter by above mentioned inmate. I will need to obtain the original letter for my files. Could you advise me how I can ascertain it[?] Is there paperwork that I need to complete or can the letter be [ob]tained otherwise[?] Please advise. The intercepted mail contained legal correspondence, a yellow post-it note requesting legal research material, and a signed power of attorney form.

1 Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Williams v. Hartford Police Dept., No. 18-2465 (2d Cir. 2018).

2 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider any documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). Although the Plaintiff did not attach the email to the Amended Complaint. It was attached to the original complaint and is relied upon by all parties in their briefs.

The defendants kept copies of the letter but the other materials in the mail package were destroyed. According to the plaintiff, Gogins forwarded the letter to her attorneys in the pending civil rights case, Attorneys Nathalie Feola-Guerreri and Rebecca M. Harris. Those attorneys later filed the letter as an attachment to a motion in that case. The letter never reached its intended recipient, and the plaintiff did not become aware that it had been intercepted except through the proceedings in the previous case.

The plaintiff contends that Gogins unlawfully obtained his mail in violation of the 4 th

Amendment and used it in furtherance of her defense in Williams, No. 3:15-cv-933, as a form of retaliation for his exercise of his 1 st

Amendment rights. The Plaintiff had filed multiple grievances against her in

Discussion

The First Amendment Retaliation Claim Gogins first argues that the First Amendment claim should be dismissed as ntiff has failed to allege that she caused him actual injury. T

for the pending civil action against her.

that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the [official] took adverse

action against the inmate, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the (Emphasis added.) Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); Espinal v. Goord, 558

, 08-CIV- 941, 2013 WL 1914434, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003)); see alo Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F. Supp. 2d 370, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (prisoners may be required to tolerate more than citizens before alleged retaliatory action against them is considered adverse). In order to allege causation, the inmate must state Moore v. Peters, 92 F. Supp. 3d

109, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).

claims with skepticism and require that they be supported by specific facts; conclusory

statements are not suffi Riddick v. Arnone, No. 3:11-CV-631 (SRU), 2012 WL 2716355, at *6 (D. Conn. Jul. 9, 2012).; see also Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d

even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation can be characterized as a constitutionall overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). retaliatory motiv Moore, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (quoting Johnson v. Eggersdorf

Cir. 2001)).

Here, Gogins claims that the plaintiff cannot prevail on his retaliation claim therefore her alleged actions did not cause the plaintiff any harm. Notwithstanding the conclusory allegations to the contrary, it is clear that Gogins did not steal, intercept, confiscate or Nor is there any allegation that she directed such action or would have been able to direct such action. The complaint is perfectly clear that the theft or interception of

his mail. Insofar as Gogins had no role in said adverse action, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim. defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, as Gogins did not take the adverse action complained of, there is no basis upon which to ascribe her retaliatory motivation to the adverse action taken by others. allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient. The First Amendment retaliation claim is

DISMISSED.

The Fourth Amendment Claim that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege their personal involvement in the illegal

search and seizure. The plaintiff counters that the allegations show that Gogins viewed the private mail without a warrant and ultimately used it in furtherance of her defense to the pending civil action against her. As for Quiros, the plaintiff argues that the

his materials in her e-mail to Gogins.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Fourth Amendment protects actual or subjective expectation of privacy when that expectation is one that society

recognizes as reasonable. Id. at 361. Prisoners have limited, if any, reasonable expectations of privacy because of their confinement status. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524-30 (1984) (loss of privacy is inherent incidence of confinement). Generally. a in his prison correspondence would yield to the legitimate penological interests of the prison facility. See Dillhunt v. Theriault, No. 9:07-CV-0412 (GTS/DEP), 2009 WL 4985477, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009). prison correspondence does not violate that United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); see

also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 699 (2d Cir. 1996); Correa v. McLeod, No. 3:17-CV-1059 (VLB), 2017 WL 2962884, at *2 (D. Conn. Jul. 11, 2017). Reasonable cause may include the investigation of ongoing illegal inmate activity or the monitoring y influence a trial or disciplinary proceeding against him. See United States v. Simmons, No. 13-CR-6025 (CJS), 2016 WL 285176, at *26 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016) (citing Workman, 80 F.3d 699 and Acevedo v. Fischer, No. 12- CIV-6866 (RA) (AJP), 2015 WL 7769486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2015)). Irrespective of whether the interception of the plaintiff s mail violated his Fourth Amendment rights, both Gogins and Quiros aver that the plaintiff has failed to allege

their personal involvement in the purportedly illegal search and seizure. As noted above, personal involvement of [the] defendants in [the] alleged constitutional deprivations is a Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to Quiros, the Court agrees that the allegations and the e-mail printout do not sufficiently state a Fourth Amendment claim. Notwithstanding t allegations to the contrary, -mail to Gogins clearly states that other DOC

officials, at the facility, It not disputed that Quiros does not work at the facility at which the Plaintiff is confined. There are insufficient factual allegations that Quiros was in any way involved in the theft or interception of the P The Fourth Amendment claim for damages against Quiros in her individual capacity is DISMISSED.

As to Gogins - conclusory allegations regarding Gogins involvement in the purported Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, Gogins is one step further removed from the theft or

question, she then advised Gogins conclusory allegations notwithstanding, it is clear that Gogins was not party to or

The remaining question then is whether Gogins and subsequent use in the civil action, is sufficient to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. This court has identified no appellate precedent which addresses this question. However, given the well established requirement that the defendant be personally involved in the

constitutional deprivation, absent allegations, at the very least, that the recipient of an item obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was aware of that fact, liability for mere receipt and subsequent use of the item does not give rise to liability. Here, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support the conclusory allegation that Gogins was aware of the Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, the email makes manifest that Gogins understood the seizure to have been administratively permissible and makes inquiry as to what proper procedure she should pursue in order to obtain the original of the seized letter. The Fourth Amendment claim against Gogins is DISMISSED.

injunctive relief against her, particularly the return of the original letter. that was confiscated and never reached its intended recipient. A plaintiff need not show personal involvement in order to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. 3

See Davidson v. Scully, 148 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). It is not clear at this stage of the proceeding whether the original letter has been returned to the plaintiff or, if not, who has possession of it. The Court therefore permits the Fourth Amendment claim to proceed against Quiros in her official capacity for injunctive relief. If the original letter is located and returned to the Plaintiff, this claim may be dismissed as moot and the parties should so notify the court. The First Amendment claim against Gogins is DISMISSED. The Fourth Amendment claims against Gogins and Quiros in their individual capacities are

3 and [l]aws of the See Ward v. Thomas, 207 F.3d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2000) (Eleventh Amendment bars declaration that state violated federal law in the past). Therefore, the request for declaratory relief is dismissed.

DISMISSED. The Fourth Amendment claim against Quiros in her official capacity and for injunctive relief shall proceed. The Clerk is directed to terminate Gogins as a defendant and to terminate Quiros as a defendant in her individual capacity.

SO ORDERED. Dated this 2 nd

day of January 2019 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

_/s/_______________________

Kari A. Dooley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT CHARLES C. WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, : :

v. : No. 3:17-CV-2098 (KAD) : HARTFORD, et al. :

Defendants. : December 19, 2018 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DE#s 42, 45) Preliminary Statement of the Case On December 18, 2017, the plaintiff, Charles C. Williams, a prisoner in the pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of Hartford, Hartford Police Detective Cheryl Gogins, and DOC Correction Officer Nancy Quiros. He filed an amended complaint on July 9, 2018. After initial review, the Court, Thompson, J. First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against Gogins and his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim to proceed against Gogins and Quiros. Initial Review Order at 11-13. The Court dismissed the claim against the city of Hartford. Id. at 6. On October 15 and 24, 2018, Gogins and Quiros filed separate motions to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiff filed memoranda in opposition to both motions. For the following reasons, the Gogins Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Quiros Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part. Standard of Review

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly [the] plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendan Id. The plausibility standard is not a probability requirement; the complaint must show, not merely allege, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See id.

LaMagna v. Brown (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). See also Amaker v. New York State

Dept. of Corr. Servs. 011) (same). Accordingly, the Court Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This is true whether the plaintiff has counsel or appears pro se. Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). However, [w]here . . . the complaint was filed pro se Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d

509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Allegations On May 17, 2015, the plaintiff filed a civil rights action against Gogins and the

libel, and other claims stemming from his 2013 arrest for sexual assault and unlawful

restraint. Williams v. Hartford Police Dept., No. 3:15-CV-933 (AWT). The Court, Thompson, J., dismissed that case with prejudice after concluding that the plaintiff had attempted to defraud the Court by deliberately falsifying an exhibit and submitting sworn verifications in support of the false exhibit. Williams, No. 3:15-CV-933, Order No. 456. 1

In 2016, while his first civil rights case was pending in this Court, the plaintiff alleges that Quiros intercepted some of his outgoing legal mail and e-mailed it as an attachment to Gogins. The plaintiff attached to his opposition memoranda a copy of the e-mail exchange between Quiros and Gogins. 2

In the e-mail, dated July 23, 2015, Quiros stated the following to Gogins:

Not sure where the case is right now. But the facility intercepted a letter that I/M Williams tried sending out as legal mail. Please see attached. Please let me know if I should release the letter or hold it for evidence. Gogins responded later that afternoon stating:

Thank you for apprising me of this letter by above mentioned inmate. I will need to obtain the original letter for my files. Could you advise me how I can ascertain it[?] Is there paperwork that I need to complete or can the letter be [ob]tained otherwise[?] Please advise. The intercepted mail contained legal correspondence, a yellow post-it note requesting legal research material, and a signed power of attorney form.

1 Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Williams v. Hartford Police Dept., No. 18-2465 (2d Cir. 2018).

2 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider any documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). Although the Plaintiff did not attach the email to the Amended Complaint. It was attached to the original complaint and is relied upon by all parties in their briefs.

The defendants kept copies of the letter but the other materials in the mail package were destroyed. According to the plaintiff, Gogins forwarded the letter to her attorneys in the pending civil rights case, Attorneys Nathalie Feola-Guerreri and Rebecca M. Harris. Those attorneys later filed the letter as an attachment to a motion in that case. The letter never reached its intended recipient, and the plaintiff did not become aware that it had been intercepted except through the proceedings in the previous case.

The plaintiff contends that Gogins unlawfully obtained his mail in violation of the 4 th

Amendment and used it in furtherance of her defense in Williams, No. 3:15-cv-933, as a form of retaliation for his exercise of his 1 st

Amendment rights. The Plaintiff had filed multiple grievances against her in

Discussion

The First Amendment Retaliation Claim Gogins first argues that the First Amendment claim should be dismissed as ntiff has failed to allege that she caused him actual injury. T

for the pending civil action against her.

that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the [official] took adverse

action against the inmate, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the (Emphasis added.) Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); Espinal v. Goord, 558

, 08-CIV- 941, 2013 WL 1914434, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003)); see alo Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F. Supp. 2d 370, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (prisoners may be required to tolerate more than citizens before alleged retaliatory action against them is considered adverse). In order to allege causation, the inmate must state Moore v. Peters, 92 F. Supp. 3d

109, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).

claims with skepticism and require that they be supported by specific facts; conclusory

statements are not suffi Riddick v. Arnone, No. 3:11-CV-631 (SRU), 2012 WL 2716355, at *6 (D. Conn. Jul. 9, 2012).; see also Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d

even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation can be characterized as a constitutionall overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). retaliatory motiv Moore, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (quoting Johnson v. Eggersdorf

Cir. 2001)).

Here, Gogins claims that the plaintiff cannot prevail on his retaliation claim therefore her alleged actions did not cause the plaintiff any harm. Notwithstanding the conclusory allegations to the contrary, it is clear that Gogins did not steal, intercept, confiscate or Nor is there any allegation that she directed such action or would have been able to direct such action. The complaint is perfectly clear that the theft or interception of

his mail. Insofar as Gogins had no role in said adverse action, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim. defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, as Gogins did not take the adverse action complained of, there is no basis upon which to ascribe her retaliatory motivation to the adverse action taken by others. allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient. The First Amendment retaliation claim is

DISMISSED.

The Fourth Amendment Claim that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege their personal involvement in the illegal

search and seizure. The plaintiff counters that the allegations show that Gogins viewed the private mail without a warrant and ultimately used it in furtherance of her defense to the pending civil action against her. As for Quiros, the plaintiff argues that the

his materials in her e-mail to Gogins.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Fourth Amendment protects actual or subjective expectation of privacy when that expectation is one that society

recognizes as reasonable. Id. at 361. Prisoners have limited, if any, reasonable expectations of privacy because of their confinement status. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524-30 (1984) (loss of privacy is inherent incidence of confinement). Generally. a in his prison correspondence would yield to the legitimate penological interests of the prison facility. See Dillhunt v. Theriault, No. 9:07-CV-0412 (GTS/DEP), 2009 WL 4985477, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009). prison correspondence does not violate that United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); see

also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 699 (2d Cir. 1996); Correa v. McLeod, No. 3:17-CV-1059 (VLB), 2017 WL 2962884, at *2 (D. Conn. Jul. 11, 2017). Reasonable cause may include the investigation of ongoing illegal inmate activity or the monitoring y influence a trial or disciplinary proceeding against him. See United States v. Simmons, No. 13-CR-6025 (CJS), 2016 WL 285176, at *26 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016) (citing Workman, 80 F.3d 699 and Acevedo v. Fischer, No. 12- CIV-6866 (RA) (AJP), 2015 WL 7769486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2015)). Irrespective of whether the interception of the plaintiff s mail violated his Fourth Amendment rights, both Gogins and Quiros aver that the plaintiff has failed to allege

their personal involvement in the purportedly illegal search and seizure. As noted above, personal involvement of [the] defendants in [the] alleged constitutional deprivations is a Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to Quiros, the Court agrees that the allegations and the e-mail printout do not sufficiently state a Fourth Amendment claim. Notwithstanding t allegations to the contrary, -mail to Gogins clearly states that other DOC

officials, at the facility, It not disputed that Quiros does not work at the facility at which the Plaintiff is confined. There are insufficient factual allegations that Quiros was in any way involved in the theft or interception of the P The Fourth Amendment claim for damages against Quiros in her individual capacity is DISMISSED.

As to Gogins - conclusory allegations regarding Gogins involvement in the purported Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, Gogins is one step further removed from the theft or

question, she then advised Gogins conclusory allegations notwithstanding, it is clear that Gogins was not party to or

The remaining question then is whether Gogins and subsequent use in the civil action, is sufficient to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. This court has identified no appellate precedent which addresses this question. However, given the well established requirement that the defendant be personally involved in the

constitutional deprivation, absent allegations, at the very least, that the recipient of an item obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was aware of that fact, liability for mere receipt and subsequent use of the item does not give rise to liability. Here, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support the conclusory allegation that Gogins was aware of the Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, the email makes manifest that Gogins understood the seizure to have been administratively permissible and makes inquiry as to what proper procedure she should pursue in order to obtain the original of the seized letter. The Fourth Amendment claim against Gogins is DISMISSED.

injunctive relief against her, particularly the return of the original letter. that was confiscated and never reached its intended recipient. A plaintiff need not show personal involvement in order to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. 3

See Davidson v. Scully, 148 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). It is not clear at this stage of the proceeding whether the original letter has been returned to the plaintiff or, if not, who has possession of it. The Court therefore permits the Fourth Amendment claim to proceed against Quiros in her official capacity for injunctive relief. If the original letter is located and returned to the Plaintiff, this claim may be dismissed as moot and the parties should so notify the court. The First Amendment claim against Gogins is DISMISSED. The Fourth Amendment claims against Gogins and Quiros in their individual capacities are

3 and [l]aws of the See Ward v. Thomas, 207 F.3d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2000) (Eleventh Amendment bars declaration that state violated federal law in the past). Therefore, the request for declaratory relief is dismissed.

DISMISSED. The Fourth Amendment claim against Quiros in her official capacity and for injunctive relief shall proceed. The Clerk is directed to terminate Gogins as a defendant and to terminate Quiros as a defendant in her individual capacity.

SO ORDERED. Dated this 2 nd

day of January 2019 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

_/s/_______________________

Kari A. Dooley

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