The plaintiff, David A. Zeigler, appealsfrom the judgment of the trial court dismissing his zoningappeal1 from a decision of the defendant zoning
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board of appeals of the town of Thomaston (board).2The board's decision had sustained in part a certaincease and desist order issued to the plaintiff by thetown's zoning enforcement officer. The plaintiff hadappealed to the board from the order on the groundthat his commercial use of the property in question constituteda valid nonconforming use. In those parts ofthe board's decision sustaining the cease and desistorder, the board stated that the plaintiff had failed toestablish a valid nonconforming commercial use of theproperty.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court on severalgrounds. The trial court addressed and rejected eachclaim of the plaintiff, and dismissed the appeal. Thisappeal followed.
After examining the record on appeal, and after consideringthe briefs and arguments of the parties, weconclude that the judgment of the trial court must beaffirmed. The issues raised by the plaintiff were properlyresolved in the thoughtful and comprehensivememorandum of decision of the trial court.3 See Zeiglerv. Thomaston, 43 Conn. Sup. 373, 654 A.2d 392(1994). It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeatthe discussion therein contained. See Advanced Business
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Systems, Inc. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 378, 380-81,650 A.2d 540 (1994); Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola,231 Conn. 272, 274, 648 A.2d 877 (1994).
The judgment is affirmed.
1. The Appellate Court granted certification to appealpursuant to General Statutes § 8-8(o), which provides: "Thereshall be no right to further review [of the judgment of the trialcourt in a zoning appeal taken pursuant to § 8-8] except tothe appellate court by certification for review, on the vote oftwo judges of the appellate court so to certify and under suchother rules as the judges of the appellate court establish. Theprocedure on appeal to the appellate court shall, except asotherwise provided herein, be in accordance with the proceduresprovided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments rendered bythe superior court unless modified by rule of the judges of theappellate court." Following the grant of certification, the plaintiff appealedfrom the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, andwe transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book§ 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).
2. Also named as a defendant was the town of Thomaston.
3. The only claim of the plaintiff not specifically referredto in the trial court's memorandum of decision is that thetestimony of the owner of the property when the zoning ordinancesbecame effective, James Fairchild, was insufficient to establishthat the property was not being used for commercial purposes onthat date. The plaintiff argues that Fairchild's testimony waslimited to a particular portion of the property, parcel B, thatwas not identified as a separate parcel until after the effectivedate of the zoning ordinances. We read the record differently. Weare satisfied that Fairchild's testimony amply supports theconclusion that, as of the effective date of the zoningordinances, the entire property was not being used for commercialpurposes and had not been so used for approximately two years.Furthermore, as the trial