1 With the parties' consent, this case was referred andreassigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including trialand the entry of judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR AWARD TO PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AND AWARD TO CLASS REPRESENTATIVES OF REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES TO TO SETTLEMENT CLASSES (#92) I. Introduction
On December 17, 2004, the parties, plaintiffs Vicki Stokes andJean Greendyke (hereinafter collectively "the RepresentativePlaintiffs") and defendants Saga International Holidays, Ltd.,Saga International Holidays Travel, Inc., and Saga Holidays Ltd.(hereinafter collectively "Saga"), filed a Stipulation Re:Settlement Agreement and Release in this class action litigation.The Stipulation provided, inter alia, that the plaintiffs wouldapply for an award of attorneys' fees and costs in an amount notto exceed $350,000 and compensation for the RepresentativePlaintiffs in an amount not to exceed a total of $15,000. Thedefendants agreed that they would not oppose that application. OnJanuary 8, 2005, the Court granted preliminary approval of theclass action settlement.
On or about February 16, 2005, an Unopposed Motion For Award ToPlaintiffs' Attorneys Of Reasonable Attorneys Fees And Costs AndAward To Class Representatives Of Reasonable Compensation ForServices To Settlement Classes (#92) was filed. A little morethan a month thereafter on March 22, 2005, an Order grantingfinal approval of the settlement of this class action was entered with the issues of attorneys' fees and representativeplaintiff compensation remaining sub judice. At this time thosefinal fee and compensation issues stand poised for resolution.
II. Discussion
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandatesthat the court approve any dismissal or compromise of classactions. This rule includes the review of the attorneys' fees,even those that have been pre-negotiated. See Weinberger v.Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 522 (1 Cir., 1991).Courts have the "equitable jurisdiction to review and pass uponthe reasonableness of a fee application submitted for judicialapproval as part of a class action settlement." Great NorthernNekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d at 523.
Clear sailing clauses are agreements between parties to waiveobjections to attorneys' fees that do not exceed a negotiatedlimit. See Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d at 520;Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375,376 (D. Mass., 1997). In Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.,925 F.2d at 524, the agreement was that the request for attorneys' feeswould not exceed $2,000,000 while in Duhaime,989 F. Supp. at 376, the defendants agreed not to oppose a fee application ofmore then $39,000,000 plus $750,000 in expenses. In this case theagreement between the parties was that the defendants would not oppose attorneys' fees that did not exceed$350,000. This provision is of the same nature as the agreementbetween the parties in Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. andDuhaime, to wit, a clear sailing clause.
Arm's length negotiations of attorneys' fees that would notdiminish the common fund available to the members of the classaction do not have the potential for the evils of extortion andcollusion. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 524-25;Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 904-05 (2 Cir., 1985), cert.denied sub nom. Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizationsv. Malchman, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986); Duhaime,989 F. Supp. at 379. Nevertheless, a fee award that does not come from a commonfund still requires review by the court. Duhaime,989 F. Supp. at 376. In Duhaime, the dangers of a clear sailing agreementwere not present when the attorneys' fees were negotiated afterthe issues of class action were resolved. Duhaime,989 F. Supp. at 379. The parties in Malchman submitted affidavits to thecourt to demonstrate that attorneys' fees were discussed onlyafter all of the merits of the settlement had been decided exceptfor "certain minutiae." Malchman, 761 F.2d at 904. Suchagreements allay suspicions when made after the other substantiveissues of the settlement have been decided. Malchman,761 F.2d at 905.
However, attorneys' fees may be denied by a court even when there is a clear sailing agreement between the parties for the settlement ofa class action. BTZ, Inc. v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.,47 F.3d 463, 466-67 (1 Cir., 1995). When a fee application issubmitted along with the termination of a class action, courtsshould examine the reasonableness of the requested attorneys'fees. See Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223,1224-25 (2000); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9Cir., 2003) (stating that to "avoid abdicating its responsibilityto review the agreement for the protection of the class, adistrict court must carefully assess the reasonableness of a feeamount spelled out in a class action settlement agreement");Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d at 522 (a court "shouldordinarily determine the reasonableness of the fees,notwithstanding that the source of payment does not directlyimpair the class recovery.") Clear sailing agreements impact uponjudicial supervision in examining fees; "[s]uch a clause by itsnature deprives the court of the advantages of the adversaryprocess." Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d at 525; BTZ,Inc., 47 F.3d at 467. "The absence of adversariness makesheightened judicial oversight of both of these fee agreementshighly desirable, especially since the very existence of a clearsailing agreement increases the likelihood that something ofvalue will have been bargained away by the counsel." GreatNorthern Nekoosa, 925 F.2d at 525. Clear sailing clauses can breed circumstances ripe forconflicts of interest between the members of the plaintiff classand counsel for the plaintiffs. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.,925 F.2d at 524 (discussing Malchman, 761 F.2d at 906-08).There is the possibility that the plaintiffs' "lawyers might urgea class settlement at a low figure or on less-then-optimal basisin exchange for red carpet treatment on fees." Duhaime,989 F. Supp. at 377 (quoting Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.,925 F.2d at 524). Judicial scrutiny is warranted because the defendant isonly interested in getting rid of the claim, and the allocationof the funds between the attorney and the members of the classaction is of no concern to the defendant. See Boeing Corp.,327 F.3d at 963; Duhaime, 989 F. Supp. at 377 (discussing Prandiniv. Nat'l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977)).
The agreement with respect to attorneys' fees in the instantcase was submitted along with settlement of the substantiveissues between the parties. Consequently, the danger of aconflict of interest as discussed in the Great Northern NekoosaCorp. case is created. The Court must be cognizant of thispotential when deciding whether to allow the clear sailingagreement to determine the award of attorneys' fees.
Further, attorneys' fees should be reviewed in light of the"precedential value" set by the award for future class action settlements.Duhaime, 989 F. Supp. at 379; Great Northern Nekoosa,925 F.2d at 526.
When . . . a court is compelled by the nature of the case or statutory mandate to award attorney fees to a party, the determination of such award is not only a matter of public record, it becomes part of the great body of our law. A court would be shirking its responsibility to render a principled decision were it to accept without scrutiny and close examination the fees agreed upon by client and counsel.Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 717 F.2d 622, 632 (1Cir., 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Milgro Electronic Corp. v.Codex Corp., 466 U.S. 931 (1984) (holding that there was noabuse of discretion by the district court for refusing to adjustan award of attorney's fees when the attorney's submissions ofexpenses were inadequate).
As the plaintiffs have repeatedly stated in their submissionsin this case, the issue of travel agents receiving overtime is anovel idea. See Memorandum of Points #93 at 3 n. 1, 19("Plaintiff's Attorneys . . . litigated over a more than threeyear period a case that presented novel and difficult questionsof fact and law. . . ."); #93 at 8 ("It should be noted that, tothe best of the Plaintiffs' knowledge, there are no reported U.S.court cases that rule on the merits of the applicability of theadministrative or professional exemptions within the exact factpattern of tour directors within the tour industry."). Thus theprecedential value of decisions made in this case is significant. Clear sailing agreements can also engender "potential publicmisunderstandings" with regard to the class counsel. See In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225 (2 Cir.),cert. denied sub nom. Newton B. Schwartz, P.C. v. Dean,484 U.S. 926 (1987) (discussing concern for public misunderstandingwhen attorneys' fees and the class action issues were negotiatedat the same time in a class action suit comprised of injuredveterans when the settlement did not provide substantialcompensation to the members of the class action); In re GMCPick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at 768, 820(3 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. French,516 U.S. 824 (1995) (holding that review of fees was necessary inall class action settlements to prevent both abuse of appearanceand public misunderstanding). The Court must be aware that thesimultaneous negotiation of the class action issues and theattorneys' fees can create the possibility of publicmisunderstanding.
Taking guidance from the case law discussed, the Court shallexamine the request for attorneys' fees to ensure that the feesare reasonable.
A. The Applicable Law Following a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)Transfer
This action was transferred from the United States DistrictCourt, Northern District of California, on the defendants' motionpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A transferee court applies itsown interpretation of federal law, not the interpretation of thetransferor court. See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1459-60(9 Cir., 1994) (holding that "when reviewing federal claims, atransferee court in this circuit is bound only by our circuitsprecedent"). The Ninth Circuit concurred with the D.C. Circuitposition that "binding precedent for all [courts] is set only bythe Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit,only by the court of appeals for that circuit [in the absence ofSupreme Court authority]." Newton, 22 F.3d at 1459-60 (quotingIn re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C.Cir., 1987)). The District Court of Massachusetts has followedthis precedent. See Montana v. Abbot Labs., 266 F. Supp.2d 250,260 (D. Mass., 2003) ("[T]his Court is bound by First Circuitprecedent in adjudicating transferred multi-district cases. See,e.g., In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055(8th Cir., 1996) ("When analyzing questions of federal law, thetransferee court should apply the law of the circuit in which itis located."); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2nd Cir.1993) (same); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).").
Following transfer a state claim is governed by the law of thetransferor court when the jurisdiction in the original forum wasproper. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964)(superseded by statute on other grounds in Ross v. Co. OutwardBound Sch. Inc., 822 F.2d 1524 (10 Cir., 1987)). If the originalforum did not have jurisdiction, the law of the transferee courtapplies. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639; Muldoon v. TropitoneFurniture Co., 1 F.3d 964, 966-67 (9 Cir., 1993); Nelson v.Int'l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9 Cir., 1983); Bahia LasMinas Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 267 F.Supp. 2d 154, 156 (D.P.R.,2003).
Consequent to the transfer, the question arises as to whetherto apply the lodestar test of the Ninth Circuit, First Circuit,or California. However, the various versions of the lodestar ineach jurisdiction are comparable, with no substantivedifferences. Due to the similarity of the tests, it need not bedecided what law applies.
B. Award of Attorneys' Fees
The lodestar is used to determine reasonable attorneys' fees tobe awarded. The lodestar method calculates the award ofreasonable hours spent litigating the matter multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Hensley v.Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Sorenson v. Mink,239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9 Cir., 2001); Connolly v. Harrelson, 33 F.Supp.2d 92, 95 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 201 F.3d 426 (1 Cir., 1999).
A reasonable hourly rate is "calculated according to theprevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum,465 U.S. at 895.
[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to — for convenience — as the prevailing market rate.Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11.
The "`fair market rate' is the `reasonable hourly rate ofcompensation prevailing in the relevant community for similarservices by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience,and reputation.'" Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d at 95 (quotingMcLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 976 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Mass.,1997)). Although the plaintiffs have not submitted affidavits ofother attorneys to demonstrate that the rates requested arereasonable, examining prior cases is helpful. See Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d 1179,1190 (1 Cir., 1996) ("[T]he court is entitled to rely upon itsown knowledge of attorney's fees in its surrounding area inarriving at a reasonable fee. . . .")
The relevant community for determining hourly rates is thecommunity where the court sits. See Alfonso v. Aufiero, 66 F.Supp.2d 183, 197 (D. Mass., 1999) (discussing Nat'l WildlifeFed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317 (4 Cir., 1998)). There is apresumption that Boston rates will apply in federal cases in theBoston court. See Alfonso, 66 F. Supp.2d at 197. Boston iswhere the settlement occurred, so Boston is the "relevantcommunity" against which the fees will be examined.
There are several attorneys and paralegals involved in thislitigation, all requesting different hourly rates. Again, thedefendants have not objected to the hourly rates requested by theattorneys for the plaintiffs or the hours documented. Theattorneys have submitted detailed contemporaneous time records oftheir service to the class action.
John P. Connelly, Esquire, is a partner in the Boston firm ofPeabody & Arnold LLP. (Affidavit of John P. Connelly #95 ¶ 1)Connelly graduated from Boston College Law School in 1985 and wasadmitted to the Massachusetts Bar later that year in December. (#95 ¶ 2) He was an associate atHutchinson & Wheeler in Boston from 1985 to 1991, moved toPeabody & Arnold LLP where he was an associate from 1992 to 1994and then made a partner in 1995. (#95 ¶ 2) Connelly has been alitigator in both federal and state courts throughout his legalcareer handling, among other things, several wage and overtimeemployee matters. (#95 ¶ 3)
Robert Gill, Esquire, is another partner at Peabody & ArnoldLLP. (#95 ¶ 5) Gill, too, is a litigator and was admitted to thebar in 1973. (#95 ¶ 5) Terri Pastori, Esquire, graduated from lawschool in 1991, was admitted to the Massachusetts Bar in 1997 andis an associate at Peabody & Arnold LLP with experience inlitigation. (#95 ¶ 5)
John J. Dacey, Esquire, is a partner in Dacey & Sitkin of SanFrancisco, California. (Declaration of John J. Dacey #94 ¶¶ 1, 2)Dacey graduated from Hastings College of Law in 1972 and wasadmitted to the California bar the same year. (#94 ¶ 2) He hasover thirty years of business and commercial litigationexperience and has represented several class actions includingwage and overtime pay matters. (#94 ¶ 2) James M. Sitkin,Esquire, is also a partner in Dacey & Sitkin. (#94 ¶ 2) A 1982graduate of Hastings College of Law and member of the California bar since 1983, Sitkin has over twentyyears of experience as a litigator. (#94 ¶ 2)
Lawyers' fees of over $300/hr have been approved for triallawyers in Boston. See Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d at 95-6;Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp.2d 91, 105 (D. Mass.,1998). A fee of $325 per hour was deemed reasonable for a seniorlitigation partner who had graduated from law school in 1984.See Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp.,995 F. Supp. 217, 224 n. 1 (D. Mass., 1996). Rates of $345/hr and $320/hr havebeen sanctioned for senior litigators in a large Boston firm.See Guckenberger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 105 (discussing VisitingNurse Ass'n v. Bullen, Civil Action No. 94-10123-NG 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 21935, at *15 (D. Mass., Oct. 2, 1995)). In anothercase a partner at Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr withtwenty-four years of experience testified to charging $595/hr.See McDonough v. Quincy, 353 F. Supp.2d 179, 186 n. 6 (D. Mass.,2005) (discussing Tiverton Power Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. The ShawGroup, Inc., Civil Action No. 01-10914-WGY (D. Mass., Jan. 11,2005)).
Connelly requests an hourly fee of $395/hr. (#95 ¶ 9) Gillrequests an hourly rate of $445/hr. (#95 ¶ 9) Dacey requests anhourly fee of $375/hr. (#94 ¶ 10) Sitkin requests an hourly rate of $330/hr. (#94 ¶ 10)These hourly rates are reasonable in consideration of past casesthat have permitted similar fees for attorneys with similarexperience. The fees requested by the attorneys are comparableto, and within the range of, the prevailing market rate.
Pastori requests an hourly rate of $260/hr. (#95 ¶ 9) Such anhourly rate is high for someone with Pastori's years ofexperience. "[R]ates for `partners in trial firms with experiencein civil rights cases [to be] between $200 to $275 perhour'. . . ." Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d 95-96 ($200/hr for anexperienced attorney with twenty-five years of practice inMassachusetts was "on the thrifty side"). A more conservative feehas been awarded to attorneys with Pastori's experience. SeeMcDonough, 353 F. Supp.2d at 188 ($200/hr was a reasonablerate for an attorney with fifteen years of experience includingeleven years of relevant experience); LaPlante v. Pepe, 307 F.Supp.2d 219, 224 (D. Mass., 2004) (senior and mid-levellitigation attorneys with relevant experience with wererespectively awarded hourly rates of $275 and $150); Norris v.Murphy, 287 F. Supp.2d 111, 118 (D. Mass., 2003) (an hourlyrate of $265 for lead counsel was appropriate); Martinez v.Hodgson, 265 F. Supp.2d 135, 143-44 (D. Mass., 2003) ($120/hr wasreasonable for an associate that did not provide any evidence of her year of graduation, what school she attended,or qualifications); Alfonso, 66 F. Supp.2d at 197($250/hr wasreasonable for an civil rights attorney with 20 years ofexperience in civil rights litigation). Considering Pastori'sbackground and experience, her hourly rate will be reduced to$200/hr.
The paralegals have requested an hourly rate of $160/hr. (#95 ¶9) Historically paralegal fees are approved at much lower rates.See McDonough, 353 F. Supp.2d at 188-89 (hourly rate of $50/hrfor paralegal); Rolland v. Romney, 292 F. Supp.2d 268, 275 (D.Mass., 2003) (allowing a paralegal fee of $75/hr); Norris,287 F. Supp.2d at 118 ($60/hr reasonable for a paralegal); YankeeCandle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp.2d 111, 126(D. Mass.), aff'd, 259 F.3d 25 (1 Cir., 2001) ($80/hr isappropriate for mid-level paralegals, but $140 was too high);Guckenberger, 8 F. Supp.2d at 107 ($60/hr reasonable for aparalegal). In light of this precedent and in the absence of anydescription of the paralegals' education or experience, theirhourly rates will be reduced to $60/hr.
With the hourly rates set, the issue to be addressed is that ofreasonable hours. Only the hours that were reasonably expended inlitigation of the claim may be included in a request for attorneys' fees. See Hensley,461 U.S. at 433; Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1145; Connolly, 33 F.Supp.2d at 96. "[T]he judge should begin his inquiry with theamount of time documented by the plaintiff's attorney."Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d at 96. The Court must decide if any ofthe hours documented by the attorneys were unreasonable orunnecessary. Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d at 96. Hours that areduplicative will be stricken. Earthquake Sound Corp. v. BumperIndus., 352 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9 Cir., 2003) ("It is appropriatefor a district court to reduce duplicative fees when awardingattorney's fees."); see also Rodriguez-Hernandez v.Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 858 (1 Cir., 1998).
Attorney Connelly has submitted a record of the hours expendedby those from Peabody & Arnold LLP in the litigation. (#95, ExhA) Although there are no objections to the hours, it is stillincumbent upon the Court to review the hours to ensure they arereasonable.
Connelly spent 6 hours reviewing the file for the litigationagainst Saga. (#95, Exh. A at 1) Time spent reviewing a case isnot recoverable because it "cannot be considered`reasonable. . . .'" Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945,958 (1 Cir., 1984). The hours spent reviewing the case file willbe deducted from Connelly's time.
Both firms researched and did other work pertaining to thediscovery of absent class members. Connelly and others of Peabody& Arnold LLP request an award of 17 hours for this work (9 hoursfor Connelly, 7.7 hours for Pastori and 0.3 hours for aparalegal), while Dacey & Sitkin claim to have expended about 40hours (10 hours for Dacey and 30 hours for Sitkin). The amount oftime, in toto, appears excessive and likely some is redundant. Inthese circumstances the time will be reduced to 7 hours forConnelly, 5.7 hours for Pastori, 8 hours for Dacey, and 25 hoursfor Sitkin.
There are a few miscellaneous, minor items that requirereductions. There are two instances where Connelly notes atelephone call to Sitkin, but there is no description of thepurpose or reason for the call. (#95, Exh. A at 5) The partyrequesting attorneys' fees has the duty to provide adequaterecords to the court, and a record of a telephone call withoutdescribing the reason for the call is insufficient. SeeHensley, 461 U.S. at 433-4 ("where the documentation of hours isinadequate, the district court may reduce the awardaccordingly.") A reduction of 0.5 hours will be made inConnelly's time. In addition, Fleming has billed 0.4 hours to getthe online docket from the court and this will be reduced to 0.1 hours.
In the First Circuit, a distinction must be made between corework and non-core work when awarding attorneys' fees. See Parkerv. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp.2d 376, 391 (D. Mass., 2004);Alfonso, 66 F. Supp.2d at 196; Connolly, 33 F. Supp.2d at 96.The Supreme Court and the district court in California make asimilar distinction with secretarial or clerical work. SeeMissouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 (1989); Noyes v.Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 331 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1250 (S.D.Cal., 2004); Mogck v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,289 F. Supp.2d 1181, 1193 (S.D. Cal., 2003). A lower hourly rate is awarded toan lawyer for performing this sort of work.
Regardless of terms used, the purpose of this distinction is toprevent attorneys from earning their regular lawyers' fees forwork that could be performed by a less skilled employee. Therewill not be any deductions for core versus non-core orsecretarial time in this instance. All of the tasks listed in therecords were properly delegated to the appropriate person.
Dacey requests an award of $375/hr for 314 hours. After thededuction of a total of 2 hours and no change to the hourly rate,Dacey's attorneys' fees total $117,000. Sitkin's request for an hourly rate of $330 is also permitted,but 5 hours are to be deducted from his time. Sitkin's totalaward for attorneys' fees is $165,858.
Connelly's requested time will be reduced by 8.5 hours, but hishourly rate of $395 will not be altered. The award for Connellyis $41,099.75.
Pastori's hourly rate is decreased from $260 to $200, and herhours requested are reduced to 18.6. Pastori's fee award is$3,720.
Paralegal Mende's hourly rate is reduced from $160 to $60.There are no reductions in the hours requested. The award for herparalegal services is $30. Paralegal Fleming's hourly rate issimilarly reduced to $60. Her hours are reduced to a total of 3.4hours. The award for Fleming is $204.
The award of attorneys' fees to Gill is as requested, $222.50,given that both the hours documented and hourly rates arereasonable and no deductions have been taken.
The costs of the litigation have been detailed. These expensesand disbursements are well within the bounds of reasonable and soshall be awarded without deduction.
At the Court's request, the plaintiffs' attorneys have filedsupplemental affidavits with respect to attorneys' fees and costsincurred from February 15, 2005 through June 30, 2005. During this time period, Daceyperformed 12.4 hours of work on this case which, at $375/hr,totals $4,650. Sitkin performed 11.7 hours of work which, at$330/hr., totals $3,861. Connelly performed an additional 6.55hours which, at $395/hr., amounts to $2,587.25. Paralegal Flemingworked .6 hours at $60/hr. for a total of $36. All of the timeexpended was reasonable and compensable. In addition, furthercosts were incurred in the total amount of $291.59. Theseadditional attorneys' fees and costs push the total compensableaward to date to $350,382.77 which is more than the amount towhich the parties agreed in reaching the settlement of this case.In these circumstances, plaintiffs' attorneys shall be awardedthe maximum amount allowed in the Stipulation for attorneys' feesand costs, that being $350,000.
Lastly, a review of the attorney time records reveals theextensive amount of time devoted to this litigation by the ClassRepresentatives. As the settlement reflects, the class membersgreatly benefitted from Stokes' and Greendyke's actions on theirbehalf. The sums requested as payment for their services onbehalf of the class are eminently reasonable and so shall beawarded in their entirety. III. Conclusion and Order
For all the reasons stated, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiffs'Unopposed Motion For Award To Plaintiffs' Attorneys Of ReasonableAttorneys (sic) Fees And Costs And Award To Class RepresentativesOf Reasonable Compensation For Services To Settlement Classes(#92) be, and the same hereby is ALLOWED to the extent that (1)plaintiffs are AWARDED attorneys' fees and costs in the totalamount of $350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand dollars),plaintiff Stokes is AWARDED the sum of $10,000 (ten thousanddollars) for her services as a class representative and plaintiffGreendyke is AWARDED the sum of $5,000 (five thousand dollars)for her services as a class representative, sums which areunopposed by the defendants.