*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica- tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. *********************************************** SCHIMENTI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LLC v. JOSEPH SCHIMENTI (AC 44274) Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js. Syllabus Theplaintiffconstructionmanagementfirmsoughttorecoverdamagesfrom thedefendant,aformeremployee,for,interalia,breachofcontractand breachofthecovenantofgoodfaithandfairdealing.Theplaintiffhired the defendant in 1998. In 2014, the defendant was promoted and, in connection therewith, received and signed a promotion letter, which confirmed his promotion, described the responsibilities, compensation and benefits of his new position, stated that he remained an at-will employee,andprovidedthathewasrequiredtoexecuteanondisclosure agreement as a condition of his continued employment. The nondisclo- sure agreement, which the defendant also signed, included a provision that prohibited him from competing with the plaintiff's business for the durationofhisemploymentandfortwoyearsfollowingthetermination ofhisemployment.In2018,thedefendantresignedfromhisemployment withtheplaintiffandacceptedapositionwithacompetitorconstruction company.Thereafter,theplaintiffcommencedthisaction,claimingthat thedefendanthadbreachedthenondisclosureagreement.Thedefendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to two counts of the plaintiff's complaint,claimingthattherestrictivecovenantssetforthinthenondis- closure agreement were unenforceable because the agreement lacked consideration.Thetrialcourtgrantedthedefendant'smotion,determin- ing that the nondisclosure agreement was unenforceable for a lack of consideration, and it denied the plaintiff's motion for a determination in favor of an immediate appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew the remaining counts of its complaint, and it appealed to this court. Held thatthetrialcourterredingrantingthedefendant'smotionforsummary judgment as there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's continued employment constituted sufficient consideration for the nondisclosure agreement: pursuant to Roessler v. Burwell (119 Conn. 289), which was binding precedent, the continued employmentofanat-willemployeecouldconstitutesufficientconsider- ationfortheexecutionofarestrictivecovenant,andtheSuperiorCourt decisionsthat haveheldto thecontrarysince thatdecision eitherfailed to consider Roessler or distinguished it on the basis of circumstances thatwereinapplicabletothepresentcase;moreover,theevidencebefore the trial court, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that, by signing the nondisclosure agreement, the plaintiff received the benefit of the defendant's services and the benefit of the restrictivecovenantandthedefendantreceivedthebenefitofcontinued employment, as the defendant was an at-will employee who could be terminated at the plaintiff's discretion, the promotion letter explicitly statedthattheexecutionofthenondisclosureagreementwasacondition ofthe defendant'scontinued employment,andthe defendantcontinued his employment with the plaintiff for four years after executing the nondisclosure agreement before he voluntarily resigned; furthermore, the trial court's reliance on Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc.(153Conn.App.50),ingrantingthedefendant'smotionforsummary judgment, was misplaced because the holding inThoma that continued employment was insufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant was limited to the facts of that case and was not inconsistent with, nor did it undermine, the reasoning of Roessler, as the court in Thoma did notconcludeorsuggestthatcontinuedemploymentcouldnotconstitute adequate consideration for a restrictive covenant. Argued May 10, 2022Ðofficially released January 17, 2023 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior CourtinthejudicialdistrictofDanburyandtransferred to the judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, where the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the defendant'smotionforsummaryjudgmentwithrespect tocertaincountsofthecomplaint;thereafter,thecourt, Moukawsher,J.,deniedtheplaintiff'smotionforawrit- tendeterminationinfavorofanimmediateappeal;sub- sequently, the plaintiff withdrew the remaining counts of the complaint; judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings. Robert M. Barrack, with whom, on the brief, was Peter E. Strniste, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff). Lori B. Alexander, with whom, on the brief, was Stephen P. Rosenberg, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Schimenti Construction Company, LLC, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Joseph Schimenti, on counts one and two of its com- plaint alleging breach of an employment contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in determining that continued employment of an at-will employee 1 does not constitute consideration for a restrictive covenant. 2 We agree with plaintiff's claim and,therefore,reversethesummaryjudgmentrendered in favor of the defendant and remand the case for fur- ther proceedings. The following facts and procedural history, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the non- moving party, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. See, e.g., DAB Three, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, 215 Conn.App.835,837,283A.3d1048(2022).Theplaintiff, aconstructionmanagementfirmorganizedandexisting under the laws of the state of New York, with its head- quarters located in Ridgefield, Connecticut, employs morethan200employees.Thepresidentandsoleowner of the plaintiff is Matthew Schimenti (Matthew), the cousin of the defendant. 3 The plaintiff employed the defendant beginning in 1998. On various dates in 2013, thedefendantinformedMatthewthathe``wantedmore responsibilityandtobeinvolvedinthestrategicgrowth of[theplaintiff]andtheoverallmanagement''andindi- catedthathisultimategoal includedobtaininganown- ership interest in the plaintiff. Matthew responded that hewouldconsidercreatinganewpositionthatincluded additionalresponsibilitiesandincreasedcompensation for the defendant but noted that providing him with an ownership interest ``was not possible at that time . . . .'' At the beginning of 2014, the defendant held the title of project executive 4 and received a salary of $165,000peryear.AtsomepointinJanuaryorFebruary, 2014, the defendant was promoted to managing direc- tor. 5 On February 25, 2014, Matthew presented the defen- dant with two documents, a promotion letter and a nondisclosure agreement. 6 The promotion letter, dated February 25, 2014, confirmed the defendant's promo- tion to managing director, effective February 1, 2014. Thispromotionletterdescribed,interalia,theresponsi- bilities,compensation,andbenefitsofthenewposition. Itstatedthatthedefendant'sinitialbasesalaryasman- agingdirectorwouldstartat$165,000peryearandthat, effective August 1, 2014, it would increase to $185,000 peryear,providedthatheachievedperformanceobjec- tives and was actively employed with the plaintiff. The promotionletterfurtherstatedthatthedefendant'ssal- ary was subject to an annual review, benchmarked on relevant industry data, and was subject to adjustment based on an appraisal of the defendant's work perfor- mance and the finances of the plaintiff. It also detailed additionalbenefitsthatthedefendantwouldbeeligible for,includingfringebenefitplansandanincentivepro- gram. The promotion letter further provided in relevant part: ``This letter will outline the terms and conditions of [the defendant's] employment with the [plaintiff]. It does not create an employment contract between the [plaintiff] and [the defendant]. [The defendant] shall at all times be an employee at will of the [plaintiff], and both [the defendant] and the [plaintiff] may termi- nate [the defendant's] employment at any time for any reason, with or without cause . . . . Nothing con- tainedinthisofferconstitutesapromiseofemployment for any particular duration or [the defendant's] receipt ofcompensationorbenefitsofanylevelforanyparticu- lar duration.'' (Emphasis added.) The promotion letter specifically stated: ``As a condition of your continued employmentbythe[plaintiff],youmustexecuteaNon- Disclosure,AssignmentofDevelopments&Non-Solici- tation Agreement ([nondisclosure agreement]),'' which the promotion letter indicated was attached to it. The nondisclosure agreement provided inrelevant part: ``In considerationandasacondition ofmyemploymentby [the plaintiff] . . . the [defendant] hereby agrees with the [plaintiff] as follows . . . .'' Section one of the non- disclosure agreement was titled ``Confidentiality of Information; Developments,'' section two was titled ``Covenant Not to Compete/Solicit,'' and section three was titled ``Miscellaneous.'' Section two prohibited the defendant from competing with the plaintiff's business for the duration of his employment and for two years after the termination of his employment. 7 In section three,thenondisclosureagreementprovidedinrelevant part that ``[t]he [defendant] acknowledges and agrees that [he] is an `employee-at-will' and this [a]greement does not create any obligation on the [plaintiff] or any other person or entity to continue the [defendant's] employment or to exploit any [d]evelopments.'' The promotion letter directed the defendant to sign and date both the promotion letter and the nondisclo- sure agreement. It also stated these two documents contained``theentireunderstanding''ofthedefendant's employment by the plaintiff. The defendant signed the nondisclosureagreementonFebruary28,2014,andthe promotion letter on March 17, 2014. Approximately four years later, in March, 2018, the defendantresignedfromhisemploymentwiththeplain- tiff and accepted a position at JRM Construction Man- agement, a construction company in New York City. The plaintiff commenced this action on June 25, 2018, claimingthatthedefendanthadbreachedthenondisclo- sure agreement. The plaintiff sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (operative complaint) that contained seven counts. 8 Only counts one and two of the operative complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged claimsofbreachofcontractandbreachofthecovenant ofgoodfaithandfairdealing,respectively,arerelevant to this appeal. On March 12, 2019, the defendant filed a revised answer and special defenses, including that (1) the covenant not to compete in the nondisclosure agreementwasunreasonableand,thus,unenforceable, (2) the covenant not to compete was unenforceable due to the lack of consideration, (3) the covenant not to compete was unenforceable due to the plaintiff's anticipatory breach, and (4) the plaintiff failed to miti- gate its alleged damages and harm. On September 20, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summaryjudgment as tocounts one and twoof the plaintiff's operative complaint. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the restrictive covenants set forth in the nondisclosure agreement were unenforceable because the nondisclosure agreement lacked consideration. 9 Specifically, he claimed that ``the only item of value that [the defendant] arguably received for his [signing of the nondisclosure agreement] was his continued employment by [the plaintiff]'' and that, ``[b]ecause in thiscasetherewasnoconsiderationforthe[nondisclo- sure agreement] beyond [the defendant's] continued employment, the [nondisclosure agreement] is unen- forceable as a matter of law.'' On October 25, 2019, the plaintiff filed a memoran- dum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment.Inaddressingthedefendant'sclaim of lack of consideration, the plaintiff argued that the promotionletterprovidedthatthedefendant'selevation to managing director became ``effective February 1, 2014,thataspartofthatpromotionhewouldbeentitled toaraiseto$185,000peryear(a$20,000raise)effective August1,2014,andthatasaconditionofhiscontinued employmentinhisnewpositionhewouldsignthe[non- disclosureagreement].''Theplaintiffidentifiedthepro- motion,additionalemploymentresponsibilities,andthe promise of the $20,000 raise as consideration for the nondisclosure agreement. Finally, the plaintiff noted thatMatthew```wouldhaveneverpromoted[thedefen- dant] to managing director and provided him with increased compensation unless he signed [the nondis- closure agreement].''' OnDecember11,2019,thecourtissueditsmemoran- dum of decision granting the defendant's motion for summaryjudgmentwithrespecttocountsoneandtwo of the operative complaint. At the outset, the court determinedthatboththepromotionletterandthenon- disclosureagreementwereunenforceableduetoalack of consideration. It then stated that, pursuant to its interpretation of this court's decision in Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., 153 Conn. App. 50, 100 A.3d 917 (2014), ``a party giving nothing more thanthestatusquoofcontinuingemploymentÐneither offeringabenefitnoracceptingaharmÐoffersnocon- siderationtoexchangeforhispromiseandthepromise is, therefore, unenforceable.'' In the court's view, the restrictions placed on the defendant in the nondisclo- sure agreement were exchanged for the defendant's continuedemployment,whichitconcludeddidnotcon- stitute consideration as a matter of law. The court further explained that the language of the promotionletterspecificallystatedthatitdidnotcreate anemploymentcontractandthatthedefendantremained an at-will employee. Additionally, in the court's view, the promotion letter provided only the possibility of future raises, bonuses, and salary reviews based on industrybenchmarks.Thecourtreasonedthatthenon- disclosure agreement also granted the defendant noth- ing in exchange for his promises to keep the plaintiff's confidences. On December 27, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion fordeterminationinfavorofanimmediateappeal,pur- suant to Practice Book §61-4, 10 in which it alleged that the court's grant of summary judgment as to counts oneandtwooftheoperativecomplaint``presentsissues of such significance to the determination of the final outcome of the case that it warrants immediate review . . . .''Thecourtdeniedtheplaintiff'smotiononFebru- ary19,2020.Thereafter,onSeptember1,2020,theplain- tiff withdrew the remaining counts of the operative complaint. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that continued employment of an at-will employeedoesnotconstituteconsiderationfortheexe- cution of a restrictive covenant. Specifically, the plain- tiff argues that the court's conclusion runs counter to binding authority holding that continued employment constitutesconsiderationfortheexecutionofarestric- tive covenant by an at-will employee. We agree. The general principles governing a trial court's deci- siononamotionforsummaryjudgmentarewellestab- lished. ``On appeal, [w]e must decide whether the trial court erred in determining that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party isentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw. . . . Because the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendant] as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must decidewhether[thetrialcourt's]conclusionsarelegally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . Practice Book [§17-49] pro- vides that summary judgment shall be rendered forth- with if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submittedshowthatthereisnogenuineissueastoany material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the outcome of the case. . . . Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motionforsummaryjudgment,theopposingpartymust present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . The movant has the burdenofshowingthenonexistence ofsuchissuesbut the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist. . . . To oppose a motion for summary judgmentsuccessfully,thenonmovantmustrecitespe- cific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the movant'saffidavitsanddocuments.''(Internalquotation marks omitted.)BankofNewYorkMellon v.Madison, 203 Conn. App. 8, 20±21, 247 A.3d 210 (2021). ``Indecidingamotionforsummaryjudgment,[i]ssue- finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of materialfact,butrathertodeterminewhetheranysuch issues exist.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. West Hartford, 168 Conn. App. 354, 375, 147 A.3d 1083 (2016), aff'd, 328 Conn. 172, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018). Next, we set forth the general legal principles neces- sary for the resolution of the plaintiff's appeal, which require us to determine whether the nondisclosure agreement could constitute an enforceable contract. To be enforceable, a contract must be supported by consideration. Tedesco v. Agolli, 182 Conn. App. 291, 303±304, 189 A.3d 672, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 905, 192 A.3d427(2018).``Thedoctrineofconsiderationisfunda- mental in the law of contracts, the general rule being thatintheabsenceofconsiderationanexecutoryprom- ise is unenforceable. . . . Put another way, [u]nder the law of contract, a promise is generally not enforceable unless it is supported by consideration. . . . [C]onsid- erationis[t]hatwhichis bargained-forbythepromisor andgiven inexchange forthe promisebythe promisee . . . . We also note that [t]he doctrine of consideration does not require or imply an equal exchange between the contracting parties. . . . Consideration consists of a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is made.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinity v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn.App.791,829,277A.3d200(2022);seealsoWilla- mette ManagementAssociates, Inc. v.Palczynski, 134 Conn.App.58,70,38A.3d1212(2012).Whetherapartic- ular set of facts constitutes consideration is a question oflawsubjecttoplenaryreview.Kinityv.USBancorp, supra, 830. 11 Guided by these general principles, we nextturntothecaselawregardingtheissueofwhether continuedemploymentcanconstitutesufficientconsid- eration to support a restrictive covenant. WebeginouranalysiswithourSupremeCourt'sdeci- sion in Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934). 12 In Roessler, the plaintiff was engaged in the business of manufacturing delicatessen products and selling them to retail stores in New Haven county. Id., 290.In1926,thedefendantbeganworkingfortheplain- tiff as a salesman for a weekly salary without a written agreement.Id.OnOctober10,1929,thepartiesentered into a written employment agreement. Id. The agree- ment provided that the plaintiff agreed to employ the defendant as a salesman ``indefinitely,'' that the defen- dant would be compensated ``by such weekly wages as maybemutuallyagreeduponbetweenthepartiesfrom time to time,'' and that, ``in the event the [plaintiff] should discharge or discontinue the services of the [defendant] for any cause whatsoever, the [defendant] would not for a period of one year after severing his connection with the [plaintiff], call upon, or directly or indirectly, in any capacity, solicit the same business from,anyofthecustomersofthe[plaintiff]inthelocal- ity specified . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 290±91. 13 During his employment, the defen- dant was paid and accepted different amounts as weekly wages. Id., 291. In January, 1934, the defendant voluntarily left his employmentwiththeplaintiffandbegantosolicitorders from the plaintiff's customers for products similar to those sold by the plaintiff. Id., 291±92. The defendant claimed that he was not bound by the solicitation restriction in his agreement with the plaintiff. Id., 292. Theplaintiffbroughtanactionagainstthedefendantin whichitsoughtaninjunction``restrainingthedefendant from solicitating, canvassing or interfering in any way with the plaintiff's customers.'' Id. The trial court ren- dered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ``restraining the defendant from directly or indirectly calling upon, soliciting, diverting, or attempting to solicit, divert, or take away certain customers of the plaintiff . . . .'' Id. The defendant appealed, claiming that the written agreement ``was so vague and uncertain in its terms as not to constitute a contract, and, therefore, furnished no basis for the injunctive relief sought.'' Id. OurSupremeCourtaffirmedthejudgmentofthetrial court. Id., 295. It determined that, although the parties did not appear to have mutually agreed on the salary that was to be paid to the defendant, ``the actual pay- ment of various sums to him from time to time and his acceptance thereof without objection, constitute[d] an impliedagreementthattheyweretheamountsproperly due [to] him under the terms of the agreement. The underlying purpose of the defendant in entering into theagreementwastocontinuethereafterintheemploy- ment of the plaintiff at a mutually agreeable salary; the benefit offered him was such a continuance, in return for which the plaintiff was to receive his services and thebenefitoftherestrictivecovenantintheagreement. The defendant received the benefit he sought in that he was continued in the employment more than four yearsaftertheagreementwasmade,untilhevoluntarily left it. In such a situation . . . [t]hough there be not mutual promises, yet if, before he calls for the fulfill- ment of the promise, the promissee do perform that, inconsiderationofhisdoingwhichthepromiseismade, there is consideration for the agreement, and it can be enforced. . . . The plaintiff, having paid the defen- dant a weekly salary satisfactory to him, from the time when the agreement was made, and having continued the defendant in his employment until he voluntarily left, has given to the defendant the benefit for which he bargained, and has, by performance, made certain that which before was uncertain; the restrictive cove- nant is in itself sufficiently definite; and after the with- drawal of the defendant from the plaintiff's employ- ment, it was founded upon an adequate consideration given.'' (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 292±94. Our Supreme Courtagreedwiththetrial court'sconclusionthatcon- sideration, namely, continued employment, existed to support the nonsolicitation restriction in the written agreement. Id., 293±94. InTorringtonCreamery,Inc.v.Davenport,126Conn. 515, 520, 12 A.2d 780 (1940), our Supreme Court deter- mined that a restrictive covenant was not ``lacking in mutuality'' even though the employer could discharge the employee at any time. In that case, the plaintiff employer,TheSunnyValleyCorporation,andthedefen- dant employee had a conversation, shortly after March 1,1938,regardingthepossibleterminationofthedefen- dant's employment, and ``the defendant suggested that he had certain plans for the improvement of the busi- ness and asked if he could attempt, for a period of five or six months, to carry these plans into effect as a full time manager.'' Id., 517. On April 15, 1938, the parties entered into a contract whereby the defendant would be employed at a fixed compensation with no specific termofemployment.Id.,517±18.Thecontractincluded a restrictive covenant prohibiting the defendant from competing with the plaintiff's business for two years after termination of employment. Id., 518. InOctober,1938,theplaintiffsolditsbusinesstoThe Torrington Creamery, and the new owner terminated the defendant's employment. Id., 518±19. Thereafter, the defendant began a business in competition with The Torrington Creamery, which sought to enforce the restrictivecovenantexecutedbythedefendant.Id.,519. In upholding the restrictive covenant, the court stated: ``While, under the contract, [the plaintiff] could dis- charge the defendant at any time, this did not make the contract one lacking in mutuality as regards the enforcementofthecovenantinquestionandthe[plain- tiff]wasundernoobligationasaconditiontoenforcing it to offer to continue him in its employ. Roessler v. Burwell, [supra, 119 Conn. 293].'' Torrington Cream- ery, Inc. v. Davenport, supra, 126 Conn. 520. DecisionsfromtheSuperiorCourtsimilarlyhavecon- cludedthatcontinuedemploymentofanat-willemployee provides the necessary consideration for a restrictive covenant. In RKR Dance Studios, Inc. v. Makowski, SuperiorCourt,judicialdistrictofHartford,DocketNo. CV-08-4035468 (September 12, 2008) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 389,389),theplaintiffemployerssoughtinjunctiverelief againstthenameddefendant,adanceinstructor.Inthe application for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs allegedthatthedefendanthadcommencedheremploy- mentasanat-willemployeeonNovember29,2001,and hadexecutedanoncompeteagreementatthattime.Id. On approximately May 5, 2006, the parties executed a new, more restrictive noncompete agreement. Id. The defendant left her employment with the plaintiffs on September 28, 2007, and, shortly thereafter, began working for a different dance studio. Id. Inresponsetotheplaintiffs'applicationforaprelimi- nary injunction, the defendant argued that the 2006 noncompete agreement failed due to lack of consider- ation.Id.,390.Theevidencerevealedthatanyemployee whodidnotsignthe2006noncompeteagreementwould be terminated, and, therefore, ``[t]he issue before the court . . . is whether . . . [the defendant's] contin- ued employment as an at-will employee obviates the needforovertconsiderationto supportthe[2006]non- compete agreement.''Id. After setting forththe general principles regarding consideration, the court observed that it was bound by our Supreme Court's decision in Roessler v. Burwell, supra, 119 Conn. 289. RKR Dance Studios,Inc.v.Makowski,supra,46Conn.L.Rptr.390. Specifically,itreliedontheprinciplethatanemployee's continuedemploymentmayformthenecessaryconsid- eration for a covenant not to compete signed after the startofemployment,atleastwheretheemployeewould be discharged, or where he or she actually remained intheplaintiff'semploymentforasubstantialtimeafter the execution of the noncompete agreement. Id., 390± 91. To further support its conclusion, the court, inter alia, cited to otherdecisions from the Superior Court. 14 Id.,391.Ultimately,itconcludedthat,``[i]nlightofwhat this court considers the binding precedent of Roessler . . . thiscourtfindsadequateconsiderationtosupport the 2006 noncompete covenant, given that the defen- dant was . . . an at-will employee and then voluntarily left [her employment] one year and one half after the agreement was executed.'' Id., 392; see also Classic Homemakers,LLCv.Coolidge,SuperiorCourt,judicial district ofWindham, DocketNo. CV-15-6009733-S(July 28, 2017) (65 Conn. L. Rptr. 6, 7) (``Connecticut law does not preclude continued employment standing alone from being deemed adequate consideration to sustain a covenant not to compete, at least when an affected employee leaves that employment volunta- rily''). 15 The defendant points to decisions of the Superior Courtthathaveconcludedthatcontinuingemployment cannot constitute consideration for a restrictive cove- nant for an at-will employee. 16 We agree with the plain- tiff, however, that ``most of the [Superior Court] deci- sions indicating[that] the continued employmentof an at-will employee does not constitute consideration for a restrictive covenant fail to considerRoessler [v.Bur- well, supra, 119 Conn. 289]. Those that do consider Roessler distinguish it based on circumstances inappli- cable to the present case . . . .'' See Fairfield County BankIns.Services,LLCv.Welsch,SuperiorCourt,judi- cial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-19-6033568-S (March 11, 2020) (concluding that continued employ- ment is inadequate consideration for noncompete agreement and distinguishing line of cases following Roessler in which continued employment constitutes considerationforrestrictivecovenantsongroundsthat, in many of those cases, employee was at will and left employment voluntarily); J.M. Layton & Co. v. Millar, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, DocketNo.CV-04-0084446-S(August9,2004)(37Conn. L.Rptr. 649,651)(Thetrial courtdidnot addressRoes- sler but stated that ``[i]t is well settled law in Connecti- cut . . . that continued employment is not consider- ation for a covenant not to compete entered into after the beginning of the employment. . . . In the context of either non-compete or non-solicit agreements, con- tinued employment is an inadequate consideration to support such contracts.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Hoffnagle v. Henderson, SuperiorCourt,judicialdistrictofHartford,DocketNo. CV-02-0813972 (April 17, 2003) (court stated that ``[i]t is well established that continued employment, as opposedtonewemployment,isnotadequateconsider- ation'' to support noncompete agreement but did not address Roessler); Cost Management Incentives, Inc. v. London-Osborne, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-02-0463081 (December 5, 2002) (concluding that continued employment was not sufficient consideration for restrictive covenants and distinguishing Roessler by reasoning that, in present case, ``neither of the defendants voluntarily left their employment,'' and, ``[t]herefore, it is the plaintiff itself whichhasbrokenthebargain,or,withdrawntheconsid- eration it cites for the agreements''). Some Superior Court cases have cited Van Dyck PrintingCo. v.DiNicola, 43 Conn. Supp. 191, 648 A.2d 898 (1993), aff'd, 231 Conn. 272, 648 A.2d 877 (1994) (Van Dyck), or Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 355 A.2d 110 (1974), to support the proposition that continued employment is inadequate consideration for a restric- tive covenant. Both cases are distinguishable from the present case, and, therefore, we are not persuaded by thereasoningoftheSuperiorCourtdecisionsthatrelied on these cases. In Van Dyck, the plaintiff employer brought an action against the defendant employee for breach of a covenant not to compete after the defen- dant'semploymentwasterminated.VanDyckPrinting Co. v. DiNicola, supra, 191. The defendant claimed, interalia,thattheagreementnottocompetewasunen- forceable because he signed it after starting employ- ment and ``an employee who has already commenced employment and receives no additional consideration for signing a covenant not to compete is not subject to enforcement of the covenant because past consider- ationcannotsupporttheimpositionofanewobligation. Dick v. Dick [supra, 224].'' Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, supra, 195. The court explained that ``[t]his general proposition is not, however, applicable to the situationpresented''becausewhenthedefendantbegan working for the plaintiff, there was no completed employmentcontractinplace.Id.,195±96.Atthestartof the defendant's employment, the agreement contained neither the defendant's precise compensation rate nor thenatureofthe```protection'''obtainedbytheplaintiff for entrusting the sales role to the defendant. Id., 196. Thecourtultimatelyconcludedthatthereexistedsuffi- cient consideration to support the restrictive cove- nant. Id. OurSupremeCourtinDickv.Dick,supra,167Conn. 223±24, applied New York law to determine whether a contract made between the parties was supported by consideration.Indicta,thecourtstated:``[I]tisobvious that,ifthecontractweretobegovernedbyConnecticut law, it would not be valid in that the consideration is past consideration which will not support a promise.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 224. Notably, thatcasedidnotinvolveat-willemploymentoradeter- mination as to whether continued employment consti- tuted consideration. Rather, the claimed consideration was a sum of money alleged to have been paid to the defendantinadditiontotheplaintiff'sforbearancefrom suingthedefendant.Id.,223.Dick,therefore,isinappli- cabletothefactsandcircumstancesofthepresentcase. We conclude that Roessler is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Its holding that considerationintheformofcontinuedemploymentfor at-willemployeescanbesufficienttomakeenforceable a restrictive covenant agreed to by the parties at some pointafterthecommencementofemploymentremains bindingprecedent.Further,thefactsofthepresentcase are similar to those found in Roessler. The parties do not dispute that the defendant was an at-will employee both before and after signing the nondisclosure agree- ment and that he voluntarily left the employ of the plaintiff and joined a competitor approximately four years after signing the nondisclosure agreement and the promotion letter. Because he was an at-will employee,thedefendant'semploymentcouldbetermi- nated at the plaintiff's discretion, and, therefore, the defendant's continued employment could constitute consideration for the promotion letter and the nondis- closure agreement. Furthermore, the promotion letter explicitly stated that the defendant's execution of the nondisclosureagreementwas``aconditionof[his]con- tinued employment by the [plaintiff] . . . .'' Thus, the evidencebeforethetrialcourt,viewedinthelightmost favorable to the plaintiff, showed that, by signing the nondisclosureagreement,theplaintiffreceivedtheben- efit of the defendant's services and the benefit of the restrictivecovenantandthedefendantreceivedtheben- efit of continued employment. SeeRoessler v.Burwell, supra, 119 Conn. 293. Because Roessler applies, as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by control- ling precedent from our Supreme Court. See State v. Madera, 160 Conn. App. 851, 861±62, 125 A.3d 1071 (2015). We conclude, therefore, that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's continued employment alone was sufficient consider- ation to support the nondisclosure agreement. Additionally, we disagree with the trial court's reli- anceonthiscourt'sdecisioninThomav.OxfordPerfor- mance Materials, Inc., supra, 153 Conn. App. 50, to support its determination that continued employment ofanat-willemployeecannot,asamatteroflaw,consti- tuteconsiderationforarestrictivecovenantsignedafter thestartingdateofemployment.InThoma,theplaintiff employeewashiredinFebruary,2003,bythedefendant, a manufacturer of high performance polymers. Id., 52. InMayorJune,2006,thedefendantpursuednewfinanc- ing, and one investor requested that certain employees executeemploymentcontractstoensurecontinuity.Id. As a result, the plaintiff entered into an employment agreementwiththedefendantonJune12,2006.Id.The agreement set forth the plaintiff's annual salary and benefits, created a twenty-four month employment period, subject to an automatic renewal for additional twelvemonthterms,providedthatthedefendantcould terminate her employment without cause with sixty days notice, and, in the event of such termination, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff all accrued and unpaid compensation, plus her base salary for a period of time. Id. Finally, the plaintiff was prohibited from seeking employment with a competitor of the defendant during her employment with the defendant and for six months after her employment had ended. Id., 52±53. A second employment agreement, executed on June 20, 2006, altered the terms of the first agreement, so as to render the plaintiff an at-will employee, and elimi- nated the defendant's posttermination compensation obligation. Id., 53±54. The defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment on November 20, 2007. Id., 54. The plaintiff then commenced an action sounding in breach of contract and fraud. Id. The trial court deter- minedthatthefirstagreementwasvalidandsupported byconsiderationbutthatthesecondagreementlacked consideration, and, therefore, the terms of the first agreement applied. Id., 54±55. On appeal, the defendant contended that the court improperly had concluded that the second agreement was not supported by consideration. Id., 55. Specifi- cally, it claimed, inter alia, that the elimination of the plaintiff'ssixmonthnoncompeteclauseandherincreased chance for continued employment served as consider- ation to support the second agreement. Id. In rejecting thedefendant'sfirstclaim,thiscourtnotedthatthetrial court had concluded that it was ambiguous whether the noncompetition clause in the second agreement continuedindefinitelyorendedatthetimeofthetermi- nationoftheplaintiff'semployment.Id.,57.``Here,§1.1 [of the second agreement] provided an indefinite non- competition duration and specifically cross-referenced §1.2 [ofthe secondagreement], which provideda time frame limited to the plaintiff's employment. . . . Therefore, the language in each clause of the noncom- petition restriction was not sufficiently clear for the court to reconcile them.'' (Citation omitted.) Id., 61. The trial court applied the rules of contract interpreta- tion and determined that, in the second agreement, ```the plaintiff lost her rights to termination pay and gained nothing in return.''' Id., 57. This court agreed withtheanalysisanddeterminedthat,underthesefacts and circumstances, the court properly found that the ambiguous noncompetition restriction, which still could restrict the plaintiff's postemployment activities, did not constitute consideration to support the second agreement. Id., 65. Thedefendantnextclaimedthatthecourtimproperly hadconcludedthattheplaintiff'simprovedchancesfor continuedemploymentdidnotconstituteconsideration for the second agreement. The court reasoned: ``The [second]agreementclearlyinterfereswiththeplaintiff's rights as promised in the [first] agreement in that it eliminates the plaintiff's contractual right to collect terminationcompensation. . . . [T]here must be valid and adequate consideration for the less advantageous terms of employment contained in the [second] agree- ment, other than continued employment of the plain- tiff.'' (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id. This court agreed that the facts supported the court's determination that the financing sought by the defendant was not dependent on the execution of the second employmentagreement. Id.,66. ``Consequently, the record supports the court's conclusion that the defendant's financing and the plaintiff's continued employment were not predicated on the second agree- ment's execution. As a result, the court reasonably concluded that the plaintiff's continued employment, forwhichthefirstagreementalreadyprovided,didnot constitute valid consideration to support the second agreement.SeeBrianConstruction&DevelopmentCo. v. Brighenti, 176 Conn. 162, 166, 405 A.2d 72 (1978) (when a party agrees to perform an obligation for anothertowhomthatobligationisalreadyowed,although for lesser renumeration, the second agreement does not constitute a valid, binding contract).'' (Emphasis added;footnoteomitted;internalquotationmarksomit- ted.) Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., supra,153Conn.App.66±67.Thus,thiscourt'sdecision in Thoma was limited to the facts of that case, specifi- cally tothe court's findingsafter a trial thatthe second agreement eliminated the plaintiff's contractual right to severance pay and that the plaintiff's continued employment was not predicated on execution of the second agreement. See id. The court in no way con- cluded or even suggested that continued employment cannot,asamatteroflaw,constituteadequateconsider- ationforarestrictivecovenant.Consequently,thehold- ing in Thoma is neither inconsistent with nor under- mines the reasoning of Roessler v. Burwell, supra, 119 Conn. 289. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's reliance on Thoma in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment was misplaced. This is especiallytruegiventhattheplaintiffinthepresentcase presentedevidencethatexecutionofthenondisclosure agreementwasaconditionofthedefendant'scontinued employment, and the court was required to view that evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff when ruling on the defendant's motion. On the basis of the evidence before the trial court and the procedural posture of the present case, and mindful of our Supreme Court's decision in Roessler, we conclude that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's continued employment constituted consideration for the nondis- closure agreement. The plaintiff presented evidence in oppositiontothedefendant'smotionforsummaryjudg- ment that the defendant was an at-will employee both priortoandafterbeingpromotedtomanagingdirector and executing the nondisclosure agreement. Because he was an at-will employee, the defendant's employ- mentcouldhavebeenterminatedbytheplaintiffatany time,and,thus,thedefendant'scontinuedemployment couldconstitutesufficientconsiderationtosupportthe nondisclosure agreement. Additionally, the defendant voluntarily resigned from his employment with the plaintiff four years after executing the nondisclosure agreement. At trial, as the plaintiff did in Thoma, the defendantmaypresentevidencethattherewasnocon- nection between the nondisclosure agreement and his continued employment; but, if connected, continued employment can be sufficient consideration for a restrictivecovenant.Accordingly,weconcludethatthe courterredingrantingthedefendant'smotionforsum- mary judgment on the basis that the nondisclosure agreement was unenforceable because, as a matter of law, it lacked consideration. 17 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the defendant's motion for sum- mary judgment and for further proceedings in accor- dance with this opinion. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 As a general matter, at-will employment is terminable by either the employee or the employer and does not require cause. See, e.g.,Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697±98, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). 2 The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly failed (1) to find that genuineissuesofmaterialfactexistastowhetherthedefendant'spromotion andotherbenefitsconstitutedconsiderationtosupporttherestrictivecove- nant,and(2)toconsiderevidenceextrinsictothenondisclosureagreement and promotion letter at issue, which demonstrated that the defendant received a raise, bonuses and other valuable benefits in exchange for the restrictive covenant. As to the former, we agree with the plaintiff. See footnote 17 of this opinion. As to the latter, because of our conclusion that thecourtimproperlyrenderedsummaryjudgmentinfavorofthedefendant, we need not address the plaintiff's claim. 3 The plaintiff was formed in 1994 and specializes in building retail, com- mercial,entertainment,hospitality,corporateofficespace,banks,andother construction projects in the Northeast and in California. 4 A project executive is responsible for overseeing a group of project managers and reports directly to Matthew. 5 The position of managing director had not existed until the defendant's promotion in 2014. The responsibilities of this new position included ``over- seeingallof the[p]roject[e]xecutives,andexecuting thestrategicdirection ofthe[plaintiff].[Thedefendant's]responsibilitieswouldalsoincludeimple- menting and championing strategic initiatives.'' 6 Althoughthedefendantacknowledgedreceivingthenondisclosureagree- ment in late February, 2014, and the record reveals that he signed that document on February 28, 2014, he claimed that he was not provided with a copy of the promotion letter until approximately March 14, 2014, which he signed on March 17, 2014. As we previously have noted, we view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party. See DAB Three, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, supra, 215 Conn. App. 837. 7 Section two of the nondisclosure agreement provides: ``A. For so long as the [defendant] is employed by the [plaintiff] and for a period of twenty- four (24) months after the termination of such employment for any reason whatsoever, the [defendant] shall not, directly or indirectly, through or on behalf of any other person or entity, whether individually or in conjunction withanyotherperson,orasanemployee,agent,consultant,representative, orholderofanyinterestinanyotherpersonorentityorinanyothercapacity whatsoever: (i) solicit or accept construction business from any Client (whether as a general contractor, construction manager, subcontractor or otherwise) or perform any of the services performed or provided by the [plaintiff] for any Client; (ii) solicit, recruit or hire any employee of the [plaintiff] to work for a third party other than the [plaintiff] or engage in any activity that would cause any employee to violate any agreement with the[plaintiff](ordoanyoftheforegoingwithrespecttoanyformeremployee of the [plaintiff] until twelve (12) months after the date such employee has otherwise ceased performing any services for the [plaintiff]); (iii) induce or influence, or seek to induce or influence, any Client or any other person or entitywhichhasabusinessrelationshipwiththe[plaintiff](eacha`Business Affiliate')towithdraw,terminateorcurtailitsrelationshipwiththe[plaintiff] or to use the services of any competitor of the [plaintiff]; and/or (iv) make anydisparagingcommentaboutthe[plaintiff],oranyofitsofficers,members or employees, to any present, past or prospective Business Affiliate of the [plaintiff]. ``B.Solongasthe[defendant]isemployedbythe[plaintiff],the[defendant] will not undertake the planning or organization of any business activity competitive with the business of the [plaintiff].'' 8 The operative complaint alleged claims of breach of contract, breach of thecovenantofgoodfaithandfairdealing,breachoffiduciaryduty,tortious interferencewithcontractualrelationswithemployees,tortiousinterference with business relations with clients and business contacts, unjust enrich- ment, and violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act, General Statutes §35-50 et seq. 9 In his motion for summary judgment, the defendant also argued that (1) therestrictivecovenantswereunreasonablyoverbroad,and(2)theplaintiff materially breached the promotion letter. As to the former, the defendant argued that he was the only employee of the plaintiff required to enter into suchanagreement.Hefurthercontendedthatthenondisclosureagreement was unreasonable as to the protection afforded to the plaintiff, the degree of restraint placed on the defendant's ability to pursue his occupation, and the scope of the nonsolicitation provision. See, e.g., National Waste Associates, LLC v. Scharf, 183 Conn. App. 734, 745±46, 194 A.3d 1 (2018) (setting forth five factor test to evaluate reasonableness of restrictive cove- nant).Astothelatter,thedefendantclaimedthattheplaintiffhadmaterially breachedthepromotionletterbynotreviewingthedefendant'sperformance or salary and, as a result, that he was excused from performing any of his contractual obligations. In itsmemorandum ofdecision, the courtdetermined thatgenuine issues ofmaterialfactexistedregardingthereasonablenessofthedefendantbeing the only employee required to sign a nondisclosure agreement, the terms that required the defendant to ``stay away'' from the plaintiff's clients and employees for a period of twenty-four months following the termination of the defendant's employment, and the confidentiality provisions. The court did not address, specifically, the defendant's claim of material breach by the plaintiff. In his appellate brief, the defendant summarily claims that he ``submitted evidence establishing that the restrictive covenants . . . are unenforceable, because they are unreasonable'' and that ``the record evidence establishes that the [nondisclosure] [a]greement is also unenforceable because [the plaintiff] materially breached its alleged promise . . . that [the defendant's] salary would be reviewed annually and benchmarked accordingly . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He argues that this court should affirm the judgment on these alternative grounds. In its reply brief, the plaintiff contends,interalia,that``thesepurportedadditionalgroundsforaffirmance should not be considered because they are inadequately briefed . . . with noactualargument,''haveminimalcitationtotherecordortolegalauthority, and are devoid of any analysis. We agree that the cursory arguments advanced by the defendant as alternative grounds to affirm the summary judgmentrenderedbythetrialcourtarebriefedinadequately,and,therefore, we decline to consider them. See Parnoff v. Stratford, 216 Conn. App. 491, 506, A.3d (2022) (this court is not required to review issues that are improperly presented through inadequate brief and such issues are deemed abandoned). 10 Practice Book §61-4 (a) provides in relevant part: ``This section applies to a trial court judgment that disposes ofat least one cause of action where the judgment does not dispose of . . . an entire complaint . . . . If the order sought to be appealed does not meet these exact criteria, the trial courtiswithoutauthoritytomakethedeterminationnecessarytotheorder's being immediately appealed. . . . ``When the trial court renders a judgment to which this section applies, such judgment shall not ordinarily constitute an appealable final judgment. Such a judgment shall be considered an appealable final judgment only if the trial court makes a written determination that the issues resolved by the judgment are of such significance to the determination of the outcome of the case that the delay incident to the appeal would be justified, and the chiefjusticeorchiefjudgeofthecourthavingappellatejurisdictionconcurs. ``If the procedure outlined in this section is followed, such judgment shall be an appealable final judgment, regardless of whether judgment was rendered . . . by summary judgment pursuant to Section 17-44 . . . .'' (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) 11 We note that ``[w]hether an agreement is supported by consideration is a factual inquiry reserved for the trier of fact and subject to review under theclearlyerroneousstandard.''(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Kinity v.USBancorp,supra,212Conn.App.830;seealsoThomav.OxfordPerfor- mance Materials, Inc., supra, 153 Conn. App. 66 (``the record supports the court'sconclusionthatthedefendant'sfinancingandtheplaintiff'scontinued employment were not predicated on the second agreement's execution''); Sullo Investments, LLC v. Moreau, 151 Conn. App. 372, 384, 95 A.3d 1144 (2014) (``we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that the consideration underlying the note was the benefit that [the defendant] received in helping [the plaintiff]'' (emphasis added)). In the present case, weneeddecideonlywhetherthelegaldefinitionofconsiderationcaninclude continued employment and whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Answering those questions in the affirmative, we leave the determination of whether continued employment constituted consideration in this case to the trial court on remand. 12 In the motion for a determination in favor of immediate appealability, theplaintiffchallengedthecourt'sinterpretationofThomav.OxfordPerfor- mance Materials, Inc., supra, 153 Conn. App. 50, and also cited to our SupremeCourt'sdecisioninRoesslerv.Burwell,supra,119Conn.289,which we discuss in greater detail. Although the plaintiff did not cite specifically toRoesslerinitsoppositiontothedefendant'smotionforsummaryjudgment or at the hearing, we note that this is not an instance in which a party has raised on appeal an entirely new and separate theory of liability that was mentioned only in passing during oral argument before the trial court. Cf. White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 631±32, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014). Rather, although the plaintiff, in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, argued that the promotion letter and the nondisclosure agreement were supported by consideration in addition to continuedemployment,itspecificallyarguedinitsmotionpursuanttoPrac- tice Book §61-4, relying onRoessler, that continued employment was suffi- cientconsiderationforthenondisclosureagreement.Thedefendantfiledan opposition to the plaintiff's motion for determination in favor of immediate appealability on January 17, 2020, but he did not assert that the plaintiff's reliance on Roessler was improper. Furthermore, the court expressly addressed the applicability ofRoessler in its decision denying the plaintiff's §61-4 motion. Consequently, the plaintiff distinctly raised Roessler and the issue of continued employment as consideration before the court, and the court addressedtheissueandspecificallyaddressedRoessler,albeitinaproceed- ing subsequent to the granting of the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment. The plaintiff also has relied extensively on Roessler in its appellate brief. Mindful that the present appeal involves a motion for summary judg- ment, which in turn involves our plenary review of whether a genuine issue of material factexists and whether themoving party is entitledto judgment asa matterof law;seeWalker v.Lombardo, 2Conn.App. 266,269, 477A.2d 168 (1984); we conclude that the plaintiff's arguments regarding Roessler and whether continued employment, as a matter of law, can be sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant properly are before this court. 13 In distinguishing Roessler from the present case, the trial court con- cluded that the defendant in Roessler did receive consideration beyond continued employmentÐ``lifetime employment''Ðwhen he entered into the written employment agreement. We disagree with the trial court's reading ofRoessler.TheagreementatissueinRoesslerdidnotprovidethedefendant with lifetime employment; it provided only that he would be employed ``indefinitely'' and could be discharged ``for any cause whatsoever . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roessler v. Burwell, supra, 119 Conn. 290±91. An indeterminate term of employment terminable for any reason is, essentially, the definition of at-will employment. See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697±98, 802 A.2d 731 (2002) (```[e]mployment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability'''). 14 See, e.g., Piscitelli v. Pepe, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-4002472-S (November 5, 2004) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 219);NewInno,Inc.v.PeregrimDevelopment,Inc.,SuperiorCourt,judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-01-0390074-S (December 3, 2002); R & CLivolsi,Inc.v.Campanelli,SuperiorCourt,judicialdistrictofNewHaven atMeriden,DocketNo.CV-97-0259105-S(October8,1997);DanielV.Keane Agency, Inc. v. Butterworth, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 313181 (February 22, 1995); Russo Associates, Inc. v. Cachina, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 276910 (January 27, 1995) (13 Conn. L. Rptr. 408); Nurotocco of Mass., Inc. v. Kudlach, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. CV-92- 0453323-S (October 6, 1993). Additionally,theplaintiffdirectsustoadditionaldecisionsfromtheSupe- rior Court that have held that continued employment is adequate consider- ationtosupportarestrictivecovenant.See,e.g.,Grosev.Didi,LLC,Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6079775-S (April 11, 2018) (66 Conn. L. Rptr. 293); DelVecchio Reporting Services, LLC v. Edwards, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV- 16-6061264-S(July13,2017);DiscoverytelSPC,Inc.v.Pinho,SuperiorCourt, judicialdistrictofHartford,DocketNo.CV-10-6011816-S(October14,2010); Blum,Shapiro&Co.,P.C.v.Searles&Houser,LLC,SuperiorCourt,judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-99-0586283-S (August 11, 1999); Lester Telemarketing v. Pagliaro, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-98-0414347-S (September 3, 1998) (23 Conn. L. Rptr. 21). 15 Federal case law supports the conclusion that continued employment may constitute consideration in this context. In MacDermid, Inc. v. Selle, 535 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (D. Conn. 2008), the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut stated: ``[T]he Connecticut Supreme Court has long recognized that continued employment may suffice as adequate considerationtosupportacovenantinanat-willemploymentrelationship.'' See also United Rentals, Inc. v. Distefano, United States District Court, DocketNo.09-CV-958(PCD)(D.Conn.November10,2009);HomeFunding Group, LLC v. Kochmann, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06CV1234(HBF)(D.Conn.June7,2007);UnitedRentals,Inc.v.Bastanzi, UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,DocketNo.3:05CV596(RNC)(D.Conn.Decem- ber 22, 2005); Sartor v. Manchester, 312 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245 (D. Conn. 2004); Weseley Software Development Corp. v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137, 144 (D. Conn. 1997). Additionally, courts across the country likewise have determined that continuedemploymentmayserveasconsiderationinthiscontext.See,e.g., Condelles v. Alabama Telecasters, Inc., 530 So. 2d 201, 204 (Ala. 1988); Lucht's Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058, 1059±60 (Colo. 2011); Breed v. National Credit Assn., Inc., 211 Ga. 629, 632±33, 88 S.E.2d 15 (1955); Ins. Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 111 Idaho 206, 207±208, 723 P.2d 190 (App. 1986);Puritan-BennettCorp. v.Richter, 8 Kan. App. 2d 311, 314±15, 657 P.2d 589 (1983); QIS, Inc. v. Industrial Quality Control, Inc., 262 Mich. App. 592, 594, 686 N.W.2d 788 (2004), appeal denied, 472 Mich. 872, 693 N.W.2d 814 (2005); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 683, 406 A.2d 1310 (1979); Zellner v. Stephen D. Conrad, M.D., P.C., 183 App. Div. 2d 250, 255±56, 589 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1992); Lake Land Employ- ment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 245±48, 804 N.E.2d 27 (2004); Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 178 Vt. 396, 400±404, 886 A.2d 365 (2005). In explaining the reasoning for this approach, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, inRunzheimerInternational,Ltd. v.Friedlen, 362 Wis. 2d 100, 862 N.W.2d 879 (2015), stated: ``Jurisdictions that rule forbearance of the right to terminate an at-will employee is lawful consideration . . . typi- cally reason that employees are obtaining the expectation of continued employment,whichisnotworthlessorillusory.TheAmericanLawInstitute embracesthis[majority]view.''(Footnoteomitted.)Id.,119.Thecourtdeter- mined that, in Wisconsin, ``[f]orbearance in exercising a legal right is valid consideration''; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 120; and, therefore, promising not to fire an existing at-will employee in exchange for the employee immediately signing a restrictive covenant was a valid example of forbearance in exercising a legal right. Id., 120±24. It further determined that the court ``repeatedly recognized the existence of lawful consideration in the inverse situationÐwhen an at-will employee continues working for the employer in exchange for amodification or addition to the employment agreement.Inthesesituations,theemployerisnotgettingadditionalconsid- eration for the employee's continued employment, and, in the absence of an employment contract, the employee is still free to leave in the future.'' (Footnoteomitted;internalquotationmarksomitted.)Id.,122±23.Thecourt alsonotedthatthisview``avoidsthetemptationforemployerstocircumvent thelaw.Ifweweretoholdthatconsiderationbeyondcontinuedemployment is necessary in cases like this, an employer might simply fire an existing at-willemployeeandthenre-hiretheemployeethenextdaywithacovenant not to compete.'' Id., 123. Incontrast,otherstateshaveadoptedtheminorityapproach,holdingthat continued employment does not constitute consideration for a restrictive covenant. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980), explained that ``caseswhichhaveheldthatcontinuedemploymentisnotasufficientconsid- eration stressthe factthat anemployee frequentlyhas nobargaining power onceheisemployedandcaneasilybecoerced.Bysigninganoncompetition agreement, the employee gets no more from his employer than he already has, and in such cases there is a danger that an employer does not need protection for his investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose barriers to prevent an employee from securing a better job elsewhere.'' See also Hejl v. Hood, Hargett & Associates, Inc., 196 N.C. App. 299, 304±305, 674S.E.2d425(2009)(restrictivecovenantenteredintoafteralreadyexisting employment relationship must be supported by new consideration); Socko v.Mid-AtlanticSystemsofCPA,Inc.,633Pa.555,570,126A.3d1266(2015) (same); Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 152 Wn. 2d 828, 834±36, 100 P.3d 791 (2004) (noncompete agreement entered into after employment must be supported by independent consideration, such as increased wages, promo- tion, bonus, fixed term of employment or, perhaps, access to protected information; continued employment alone is insufficient). 16 See, e.g., Classic Homemakers, LLC v. Coolidge, supra, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 7 (decisionsof Superior Court between 1985 and2008 go ``both ways'' on whether continued employment constitutes consideration for at-will employee in context of restrictive covenant). 17 The plaintiff also claims that, even if continued employment is not sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant, there is still a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the promotion, and its corresponding financial benefits and additional employment opportunities for the defen- dant, constituted sufficient consideration to support the nondisclosure agreement, and, therefore, the court erred in determining that no such consideration existed. We agree with the plaintiff. See, e.g., A.H. Harris & Sons, Inc. v. Naso, 94 F. Supp. 3d 280, 292±93 (D. Conn. 2015); Weseley Software Development Corp. v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137, 144 (D. Conn. 1997); Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, supra, 43 Conn. Supp. 195±96. Weemphasizethatthetermsofthepromotionletterrequiredthedefendant to sign the nondisclosure agreement. Additionally, we note that the defen- dant signed the nondisclosure agreement and the promotion letter suffi- ciently contemporaneous with the effective date of the promotion, such that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the promotion constituted additional consideration for the nondisclosure agreement. See Home Funding Group, LLC v. Kochmann, United States District Court, DocketNo.3:06CV1234(HBF)(D.Conn.June7,2007).Weneednotaddress thisclaimfurtherinlightofourconclusionthatthecourtincorrectlygranted summaryjudgmentonthebasisthattherestrictivecovenantwasunenforce- able because it lacked consideration.