This is an appeal from a judgment of the SuperiorCourt dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal from thegranting of an application for an inland wetlandspermit for a proposed subdivision to the defendantRed Hill Development Corporation et al. by thedefendant Glastonbury Conservation Commission(commission).1 The plaintiffs are the RedHill Coalition, Inc. (coalition), a nonprofitcorporation formed to promote its concept ofdevelopment for the Red Hill section of Glastonbury,Thomas Fitzgerald, a member of the coalitionand a landowner whose property abuts the
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southern boundary of the proposed subdivision, andJulianne Steffens, president of the coalition anda resident of Glastonbury.
The defendant commission issued an inlandwetlands permit to the applicants Red HillDevelopment Corporation and its principals,Charles Pezzente and John Coccomo, Sr.(applicants), to discharge drainage into awetland, and to fill a small upland pond andinstall culverts in a wetlands ravine inconnection with the construction of a road onthe property in question. The permit was issuedon the condition that the applicants provide"reasonable compensation for wetland developmentor enhancement." The plaintiffs appealed thedecision of the Superior Court to the AppellateCourt. We transferred the appeal to ourselvespursuant to Practice Book 4023.
In their appeal the plaintiffs claim that thetrial court erred when it determined that: (1)the commission did not exceed its authority whenit imposed off-site compensation as a conditionfor the issuance of the wetlands permit; (2)adequate notice was given of the final actiontaken by the commission; (3) the off-sitecompensation condition was not overly vague andunenforceable; and (4) the applicants submitted,and the commission considered, alternatives asrequired by General Statutes 22a-41.2
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The relevant facts are as follows. The applicantsapplied to the commission for a class B3 inlandwetlands permit pursuant to "The Inland Wetlands andWatercourses Act"; General Statutes 22a-36 et seq.(wetlands act); and 5 of the Glastonbury InlandWetland and Watercourse Regulations, to construct aroadway and storm drainage outlets on a site ownedby the applicants in an area of South Glastonburyknown as Red Hill. The property in question is afifty acre parcel of land, situated between theConnecticut River and Main Street on which theapplicants planned to construct thirty-three singlefamily homes. A ravine containing a small streamruns north and south on the site and a farm pondof approximately one fifth of an acre in size issituated on the southerly boundary of the propertyto the west of the ravine.4 A wetlands permitto fill the pond and to install culverts in theravine was required by the applicants in order tofacilitate the construction of a roadway over thewetlands which would provide access to the westerlyportion of their property.
On December 2, 1985, the coalition intervened inthe proceedings of the commission pursuant to GeneralStatutes 22a-19 (a).5 On June 19, 1986, thecommission held a public hearing on the application.Subsequently, after public meetings on July 10, 1986,
[212 Conn. 714]
and July 24, 1986, the commission approved theapplication and issued the permit requested by theapplicants. The permit was issued subject to acondition that: "The Wetlands Agency approves theelimination of the upland pond because the Agencybelieves that with the development as proposed inthe vicinity the source of water to that pond willbe minimized if not completely removed. In exchangefor the right to fill in and cross that upland pond,the applicant agrees to provide reasonable compensationfor wetland development or enhancement to be determinedin the future by a subcommittee of the Wetlands Agencyworking directly with the applicant and other interestedparties in Town to identify, define and seek properapprovals of said compensating activity."
Initially the defendant commission contendsthat the trial court erred in finding that theplaintiffs had standing to appeal the wetlandsissues pursuant to 22a-19 (a). In addition tostanding under 22a-19 (a), the commission conteststhe court's conclusion that Fitzgerald, anabutting landowner, had standing based on "themore traditional aggrievement." The trial court's"`[c]onclusions are not erroneous unless theyviolate law, logic or reason or are inconsistentwith the subordinate facts. . . .' Yale Universityv. New Haven, 169 Conn. 454, 464, 363 A.2d 1108." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill,175 Conn. 483, 491, 400 A.2d 726 (1978).
In Mystic Marine life Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra,we recognized that a party even if not "classically"
[212 Conn. 715]
aggrieved may still have statutory standing toappeal an agency's decision. Section 22a-19 (a)allows "any person, partnership, corporation,association, organization or other legal entity"to "intervene as a party" in any "administrative,licensing or other proceeding, and in any judicialreview thereof" that "involves conduct which has,or is reasonably likely to have, the effect ofunreasonably polluting, impairing or destroyingthe public trust in the air, water or othernatural resources of the state."
General Statutes 22a-19 (a) is part of theEnvironmental Protection Act (EPA). GeneralStatutes 22a-14 et seq. The purpose of the EPA is"to give private citizens a voice in ensuring thatthe air, water and other natural resources of thestate remain protected, preserved and enhanced,and to provide them with `an adequate remedy toprotect the air, water and other natural resourcesfrom unreasonable pollution, impairment ordestruction.' General Statutes 22a-15."Connecticut Water Co. v. Beausoleil, 204 Conn. 38,44, 526 A.2d 1329 (1987); see also MysticMarinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 489;Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 53-54,364 A.2d 194 (1975). By permitting intervention under22a-19 (a), the EPA allows private persons to"intervene in an existing judicial review of anagency action or to initiate an independentdeclaratory or injunctive action." ConnecticutWater Co. v. Beausoleil, supra, 44-45. Anintervening party under 22a-19 (a), however, mayraise only environmental issues. Id., 45; MysticMarinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 490.
Because the coalition filed a notice ofintervention at the commission hearing inaccordance with 22a-19 (a), it doubtless hadstatutory standing to appeal from the commission'sdecision for that limited purpose. Id., 499.The commission argues, however, that even ifthat is so, Steffens and Fitzgerald lacked
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standing to appeal under 22a-19 (a) because theydid not intervene before the commission. Wedisagree.
As previously noted, 22a-19 (a) allows anyperson to intervene to raise environmental issuesin an existing judicial review of an agency actionor to initiate an independent declaratory orinjunctive action. Connecticut Water Co. v.Beausoleil, supra, 44-45. Steffens and Fitzgeraldsatisfied that section by joining the coalition'sappeal to the Superior Court. They were notstatutorily required to file a notice ofintervention before the commission.
The trial court also concluded that the abuttingplaintiff, Fitzgerald, in addition to havingstanding under 22a-19 (a), was "traditionally"aggrieved. See Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns,194 Conn. 43, 47, 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v.West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 65, 475 A.2d 283 (1984).A finding of aggrievement "`requires that propertyrights be adversely affected by an "order,authorization or decision" of the commission[er].'Sachem's Head Assn. v. Lufkin, 168 Conn. 365, 367,362 A.2d 519 , citing Sea Beach Assn., Inc.v. Water Resources Commission, 164 Conn. 90, 94,318 A.2d 115 ." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium,Inc. v. Gill, supra, 495-96. "Aggrievement is anissue of fact; Luery v. Zoning Board, 150 Conn. 136,140, 187 A.2d 247 ; and credibility isfor the trier of the facts. Klein v. Chatfield,166 Conn. 76, 80, 347 A.2d 58 ." Id., 496;see also Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra. Thefinding of the trial court that the plaintiffFitzgerald was "traditionally" aggrieved will notbe disturbed on appeal unless the subordinatefacts do not support that finding. Walls v.Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 475, 476,408 A.2d 252 (1979). From our review of the recordwe cannot say that the trial court erred when itfound that Fitzgerald had, in addition to standingunder 22a-19, "the more traditional aggrievementstanding of having a specific, personal
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and legal interest in the subject matter ofthe [commission's] decision. Glendenning v.Conservation Commission, 12 Conn. App. 47,54, (529 A.2d 727] (1987)."6 See GeneralStatutes (Rev. to 1987) 22a-43 (a).7
The plaintiffs contend that the commissionexceeded its authority when it imposed "off-sitewetlands mitigation" as a condition of itsapproval of the inland wetlands permit for theRed Hill Development Corporation's proposedsubdivision. In this regard the plaintiffs arguethat neither the wetlands act nor the GlastonburyInland Wetland and Watercourse Regulations allowthe commission to exchange one wetlands site forthe promise to create a new wetlands siteelsewhere. On the facts revealed by the record inthis case, we disagree.
It is obvious from the record that the commissionoriginally intended, as compensation for the pond to
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be filled, to have the applicants excavate a pondat a site on Holland Brook in Earle Park,8 apublic park in Glastonbury, within 1000 feet ofthe pond to be filled on the applicants' property.At the suggestion of one of the commissionmembers, however, the resolution adopted by thecommission was loosely worded so that thecommission would not be bound by that intention ifa more attractive alternative for compensationshould present itself.
"The conclusion of the trial court that thecommission acted properly must be sustained unlessthe commission's decision is arbitrary, illegal ornot reasonably supported by the evidence.Connecticut Television, Inc. v. Public UtilitiesCommission, 159 Conn. 317, 328, 269 A.2d 276; Thompson v. Water Resources Commission,159 Conn. 82, 87, 267 A.2d 434 . Theplaintiff[s] [have] the burden of proof inchallenging the administrative action. AnthonyAugliera, Inc. v. Loughlin, 149 Conn. 478, 482,181 A.2d 596 ." Lovejoy v. Water ResourcesCommission, 165 Conn. 224, 228-29, 332 A.2d 108(1973).
The broad legislative purpose of the wetlands act isset forth in General Statutes 22a-36.9 That section
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states that the purpose of the act is to protectand preserve inland wetlands and watercourses "byproviding an orderly process to balance the needfor the economic growth of the state and the useof its land with the need to protect itsenvironment and ecology . . . ." Id. In our caselaw we have recognized that "[i]t is important toremember that `[a]gainst [the] laudable statepolicy [of such legislation] must be balanced theinterests of the private landowner who wishes tomake productive use of his wetland.' Brecciaroliv. Commissioner of Environmental Protection,168 Conn. 349, 354, 362 A.2d 948 (1975)." Huck v.Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency,203 Conn. 525, 552, 525 A.2d 940 (1987); see alsoCioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission,209 Conn. 544, 562, 552 A.2d 796 (1989); ManorDevelopment Corporation v. Conservation Commission,
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180 Conn. 692, 695, 433 A.2d 999 (1980);Chevron Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,170 Conn. 146, 151, 365 A.2d 387 (1976).
To achieve the desired balance, General Statutes(Rev. to 1985) 22a-42 (a)10 expresslyencouraged municipal regulation of wetlands andwatercourses. See Aaron v. ConservationCommission, 183 Conn. 532, 538, 441 A.2d 30(1981). That section provides In pertinent partthat "it is hereby declared to be the publicpolicy of the state to encourage municipalparticipation by means of regulation of activitiesaffecting the wetlands and watercourses within theterritorial limits of the various municipalitiesor districts." General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)22a-42 (a). The scope of municipal regulations isgoverned by 22a-42 (e), which provides in relevantpart that: "Any ordinances or regulations shall befor the purpose of effectuating the purposes ofsections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive, and, amunicipality or district, in acting uponordinances and regulations shall give dueconsideration to the standards set forth insection 22a-41."11
The plaintiffs point to General Statutes 22a-41(a)(1) through (6) and argue that the legislatureset forth six factors for consideration to "circumscribe
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administrative discretion" and those six factorsdo not include consideration of "off-site factors."Section 22a-41 (a), however, also provides thatmunicipal or district commissions "shall takeinto consideration all relevant facts andcircumstances, including but not limited to:[the six factors enumerated in the statute.]"(Emphasis added.) Similarly, Glastonbury InlandWetland and Watercourse Regulations 6.1.412sets forth a list of considerations for thecommission when reviewing permit applications.Like 22a-41 (a), that list in the local
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regulations is not all inclusive. Accordingly,the plain language of 22a-41 (a) and thecorresponding local regulations do not, as theplaintiffs argue, hamstring the commission'sadministrative discretion. Moreover, thecommission's authority to consider factors otherthan those enumerated in the statutes andregulations is supported by the scope of thewetlands act which "envisages its adaptation toinfinitely variable conditions for theeffectuation of the purposes of the statutes."Aaron v. Conservation Commission, supra, 541. Anagency empowered to implement the wetlands actmust therefore be vested with a certain amount ofdiscretion in order to carry out its function. Cf.Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission,supra, 559 (commission may exercise those powersthat "are necessary to enable it to discharge itsduties and carry into effect the objects andpurposes of its creation"); Commission onHospitals & Health Care v. Stamford Hospital,208 Conn. 663, 673, 546 A.2d 257 (1988); ArnoldBernhard & Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,194 Conn. 152, 159, 479 A.2d 801 (1984); Patry v.Board of Trustees, 190 Conn. 460, 469,461 A.2d 443 (1983); Riley v. State Employees' RetirementCommission, 178 Conn. 438, 442, 423 A.2d 87(1979).
The plaintiffs urge us to distinguish betweenthe commission's discretion to require compensatorymeasures to improve wetlands on the property thatis the subject of the permit, which they concedeare permissible, and measures to improve or createwetlands elsewhere in the community. We see nothingin the statutes or regulations that would requiresuch a distinction and prevent a local wetlandscommission from securing an agreement to provideoff-site compensation for the loss of wetlandsso long as the commission has considered theimpact of the application on the subject propertyin accord with the policies outlined in 22a-36through 22a-45 of the General Statutes and
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the local regulations. Cf. Connecticut Fund forthe Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, 192 Conn. 247,250, 470 A.2d 1214 (1984). While the commission'sdeliberations in the present case might have beenclearer and its ultimate decision more artfullystated; DeMars v. Zoning Commission, 142 Conn. 580,584, 115 A.2d 653 (1955); we cannot say thatthe commission failed to act properly in thisinstance. We conclude, therefore, that the trialcourt did not err when it found that "the imposedcondition of off-site mitigation, under thecircumstances of this case, was reasonable, basedon an adequate record and is a valid exercise ofmunicipal regulation under the Act." SeePandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester,181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1981).
The plaintiffs next claim that the trialcourt erred in holding that the notice ofthe application conditionally approved bythe commission was adequate to afford noticeof the commission's intention to seek off-sitecompensation. According to the plaintiffs, theirdue process rights were violated because thenotice issued by the commission was inadequate as"it mentioned only activities proposed to takeplace on the Red Hill site and failed to notifypersons who may be affected by the off-sitecompensation . . . ."
Initially, we note that the trial court'sdecision will not be reversed unless it isclearly erroneous. Practice Book 4061;Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229, 243,514 A.2d 323 (1986); Hall v. Planning Commission,181 Conn. 442, 445, 435 A.2d 975 (1980);"[W]here the legal conclusions of the courtare challenged, we must determine whether theyare legally and logically correct and whetherthey find support in the facts set out in thememorandum of decision . . . ." Cookson v.Cookson, supra, 243; Robert S. Weiss & Co.v. Mullins, 196 Conn. 614, 618,495 A.2d 1006 (1985). In the present case,
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the trial court determined that, although thenotice published by the commission did notspecifically mention off-site compensation, theprocedure followed by the commission did notconstitute a denial of due process because"[t]he plaintiffs had notice of the matters ofsubstance." The court noted in its memorandumof decision that at the public meeting held onJuly 10, 1986, the topics posted for discussionincluded "`[c]ompensating measures if the pond isto be eliminated.'" It went on to find that theplaintiffs "had a full opportunity to meet [theoff-site compensation issue] at the public hearingand at two subsequent public meetings which theyand their representatives attended . . . . Thereis no showing of error or prejudice so as toconstitute a denial of due process. See ForestConstruction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,155 Conn. 669, 676 [236 A.2d 917] (1967). Itcannot be said that the action of the Commissionin this regard was illegal, arbitrary or in abuseof the discretion vested in it." From our reviewof the record we cannot say that the trial courtwas clearly erroneous in concluding that theplaintiffs had adequate notice of what was beingconsidered by the commission. Pandolphe's AutoParts, Inc. v. Manchester, supra, 221.
The plaintiffs claim, however, that since theoff-site compensation was to take place in EarlePark, a municipally-owned property, every citizenin the town of Glastonbury was potentiallyaffected. The plaintiffs argue that even if theyhad notice and were present at the public hearingand meetings, other members of the public whomight have been concerned with the installation ofa pond in Earle Park were not properly notified.We reject this argument because "due process rightsare personal, and cannot be asserted vicariously.Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corporation, 168 Conn. 43,49, 357 A.2d 472 (1975); See Silverman v. St.Joseph's Hospital, 168 Conn. 160, 175-77,
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363 A.2d 22 (1975)." Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. DellaGhelfa, 3 Conn. App. 432, 449, 489 A.2d 398(1985), aff'd, 200 Conn. 630, 513 A.2d 52 (1986).The plaintiffs therefore do not have standing toraise potential claims of the public at largeconcerning the off-site compensation secured bythe commission.
The plaintiffs next maintain that the trialcourt erred by failing to find that the wetlandspermit issued to the applicants was invalidbecause the condition imposed on its issuance wasvague and unenforceable.
The record discloses that the only condition onthe issuance of the wetlands permit discussed bythe commission and agreed to by Red HillDevelopment Corporation as compensation for theelimination of the pond on the applicants'property was the enhancement of the wetlands areain the lower course of Holland Brook by theapplicants' creation of a pond in Earle Park. Asearlier, the resolution concerning compensationfor the loss of the pond on the applicants'property was loosely worded so as not to restrictthe commission from seeking other compensation inthe event a more attractive alternative was presented.
We conclude that despite the wording of theresolution, the accompanying circumstances made itsufficiently clear that the commission imposed asa minimum condition on the issuance of a wetlandspermit, the obligation on the applicants to,excavate a pond on Holland Brook. Further, thecommission has ample authority to enforce thatcondition by revocation of the applicants' permitin the event that that condition or an agreedalternate condition is not satisfied. GeneralStatutes 22a-42a (d); Glastonbury Inland Wetlandand Watercourse Regulations 7.5 and 11.2.b (i). Wefind no error concerning this vagueness claim by theplaintiffs.
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Finally, the plaintiffs contend that "the trialcourt erred by finding that the applicant[s]submitted alternatives to its proposed subdivisionplan to enable the commission to consideralternatives to the proposed regulated activitiesas it is required to do."
The short answer to this claim of the plaintiffsis that, although the applicable statutes andregulations13 mandate that the commissionconsider alternatives to the applicants' proposedaction, nowhere is it mandated that thealternatives emanate from the applicants. Weconclude, as did the trial court in its memorandumof decision, that "[t]he record is replete withalternatives proposed for consideration by theCommission whether submitted by the applicantswith their reasons why such alternatives were notfeasible or by interested parties." Neither theGeneral Statutes nor the local regulations compelthe applicants, sua sponte, to submit formal plansor drawings for all possible alternatives. Absentsuch a direction by the legislature, we will notread such a requirement into the wetlands act. SeeGlastonbury Co. v. Gillies, 209 Conn. 175, 179,181, 550 A.2d 8 (1988); State Medical Society v.Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709,727, 546 A.2d 830 (1988); Burnham v. Administrator,184 Conn. 317, 325, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Robinsonv. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972).
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1. The commission was acting as the Glastonburyinland wetlands and watercourses agency.
2. "[General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] Sec.22a-41. FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSIONER.In carrying out the purposes and policies of sections22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive, including mattersrelating to regulating, licensing and enforcing ofthe provisions thereof, the commissioner shall takeinto consideration all relevant facts and circumstances,including but not limited to: "(a) The environmental impact of the proposedaction; "(b) The alternatives to the proposed action; "(c) The relationship between short-term uses ofthe environment and the maintenance andenhancement of long-term productivity; "(d) Irreversible and irretrievable commitmentsof resources which would be involved in theproposed activity; "(e) The character and degree of injury to, orinterference with, safety, health or thereasonable use of property which is caused orthreatened; and "(f) The suitability or unsuitability of suchactivity to the area for which it is proposed."
3. Class B permits are provided for in 5.3and 5.3.1 of the Glastonbury Inland Wetland andWatercourse Regulations.
4. An expert employed by the Red HillDevelopment Corporation indicated that in earlyJuly. 1986, the pond was practically dried upwith only four inches of water in its center.
5. General Statutes 22a-19 (a) provides:"ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. (a) In anyadministrative, licensing or other proceeding,and in any judicial review thereof made availableby law, the attorney general, any politicalsubdivision of the state, any instrumentality oragency of the state or of a political subdivisionthereof, any person, partnership, corporation,association, organization or other legal entitymay intervene as a party on the filing of averified pleading asserting that the proceeding oraction for judicial review involves conduct whichhas, or which is reasonably likely to have, theeffect of unreasonably polluting, impairing ordestroying the public trust in the air, water orother natural resources of the state.
6. The trial court's finding on the issue ofFitzgerald's aggrievement made it unnecessary forthe court to determine the applicability of PublicActs 1987, No. 87-338, 8(a), amending GeneralStatutes 22a-43 (a), which was enacted subsequentto the plaintiffs' appeal but prior to the hearingin the trial court.
7. General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) 22a-43(a) provides: "APPEALS. (a) Any person aggrievedby any regulation, order, decision or action madepursuant to sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive,by the commissioner, district or municipality may,within fifteen days after publication of suchregulation, order, decision or action appeal tothe superior court for the judicial district wherethe land affected is located, and if located inmore than one judicial district, to said court inany such judicial district, except if such appealis from a contested case, as defined in section4-166, such appeal shall be in accordance with theprovisions of section 4-183, except venue shall bein the judicial district where the land affectedis located, and if located in more than one judicialdistrict to the court in any such judicial district.Such appeal shall be made returnable to said courtin the same manner as that prescribed for civilactions brought to said court. Notice of such appealshall be served upon the inland wetlands agency.The appeal shall state the reasons upon which itis predicated and shall not stay proceedings onthe regulation, order, decision or action, but the
8. Earle Park is accessible from the applicants'land by public easements and the stream on theapplicants' property, the south branch of HollandBrook, is a tributary of Holland Brook.
9. "[General Statutes] Sec. 22a-36. INLANDWETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES. LEGISLATIVE FINDING.The inland wetlands and watercourses of the stateof Connecticut are an indispensable and irreplaceablebut fragile natural resource with which the citizensof the state have been endowed. The wetlands andwatercourses are an interrelated web of natureessential to an adequate supply of surface andunderground water; to hydrological stability andcontrol of flooding and erosion; to the rechargingand purification of groundwater; and to the existenceof many forms of animal, aquatic and plant life. Manyinland wetlands and watercourses have been destroyedor are in danger of destruction because of unregulateduse by reason of the deposition, filling or removalof material, the diversion or obstruction of waterflow, the erection of structures and other uses, allof which have despoiled, polluted and eliminatedwetlands and watercourses. Such unregulated activityhas had, and will continue to have, a significant,adverse impact on the environment and ecology ofthe state of Connecticut and has and will continueto imperil the quality of the environment thusadversely affecting the ecological, scenic, historicand recreational values and benefits of the state forits citizens now and forever more. The preservationand protection of the wetlands and watercourses fromrandom, unnecessary, undesirable and unregulated uses,disturbance or destruction is in the public interestand is essential to the health, welfare and safety ofthe citizens of the state. It is, therefore, the purposeof sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive, to protectthe citizens of the state by making provisions for theprotection, preservation, maintenance and use of theinland wetlands and watercourses by minimizing theirdisturbance and pollution; maintaining and improvingwater quality in accordance with the highest standardsset by federal, state or local authority; preventingdamage from erosion, turbidity or siltation; preventingloss of fish and other beneficial aquatic organisms,wildlife and vegetation and the destruction of thenatural habitats thereof; deterring and inhibitingthe danger of flood and pollution; protecting thequality of wetlands and watercourses for theirconservation, economic, aesthetic, recreationaland other public and private uses and values; andprotecting the state's potable fresh water suppliesfrom the dangers of drought, overdraft, pollution,misuse and mismanagement by providing an orderlyprocess to balance the need for the economic growthof the state and the use of its land with the needto protect its environment and ecology in order toforever guarantee to the people of the state, thesafety of such natural resources for their benefitand enjoyment and for the benefit and enjoyment ofgenerations yet unborn."
10. General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) 22a-42(a) provides: "MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF WETLANDSAND WATERCOURSES. ACTION BY COMMISSIONER. (a)To carry out and effectuate the purposes andpolicies of sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive,it is hereby declared to be the public policy ofthe state to encourage municipal participation bymeans of regulation of activities affecting thewetlands and watercourses within the territoriallimits of the various municipalities or districts.
11. General Statutes 22a-42 (e) provides:"Municipal or district ordinances or regulationsmay embody any regulations promulgated hereunder,in whole or in part, or may consist of otherordinances or regulations in conformity withregulations promulgated hereunder. Any ordinancesor regulations shall be for the purpose ofeffectuating the purposes of sections 22a-36 to22a-45, inclusive, and a municipality or district,in acting upon ordinances and regulations shallgive due consideration to the standards set forthin section 22a-41.
12. The Glastonbury Inland Wetland andWatercourse Regulations 6.1.4 provides: "Allrelevant facts and circumstances, including butnot limited to, the following: "a. The environmental impact of the proposedaction, including the effects on the naturalcapacities of the inland wetland or water courseto support deservable biological life to preventflooding, to supply water, to control sediment,to facilitate drainage and to promote public healthand safety. "b. The consideration of the alternatives tothe proposed action which might better enhanceenvironmental quality or have a less detrimentaleffect and which could feasibly attain the basicobjectives of the activity. This should include,but not be limited to the alternative to takingno action, or postponing action pending furtherstudy, the alternative of requiring actions ofdifferent nature which would provide similarbenefits with different environmental impacts,such as using a different location for theactivity. "c. The relationship between the short-termuses of the environment and the maintenance andenhancement of long-term productivity, includingconsideration of the extent to which the proposedactivity involves tradeoffs between short-termenvironmental gains at the expense of long-termlosses or vice-versa, and consideration of theextent to which the proposed actions foreclosefuture options. "d. Irreversible and irretrievable commitmentsof resources which would be involved in theproposed activities. "e. The character and degree of injury to,or interference with, safety, health or thereasonable use of property which would becaused or threatened. This includes recognitionof potential damage from erosion turbidity orsiltation, loss of fish and other beneficialaquatic organisms, wildlife and vegetation, thedangers of flooding and pollution, and destructionof the economics, aesthetic, recreational andother public and private uses and values ofwetlands and water courses. "f. The suitability of such action to thearea for which it is proposed. This requires theCommission to balance the need for the economicgrowth of the Town and the use of its land, withthe need to protect its environment for the peopleof the Town and the benefit of generations yetunborn."
13. See General Statutes 22a-19 (b) and22a-41 (b), and Glastonbury Inland Wetland andWatercourse Regulations 6, 1.4(b).Page 727