NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a))1 in case No. FSB053053 and also pleaded guilty to maintaining a place for the unlawful use of drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366) in case No. FSB053860. In return, the remaining counts in both cases were dismissed, and defendant was granted three years of formal probation on various terms and conditions, including serving 180 days in county jail served concurrently. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the probation condition requiring her to keep the probation officer informed of whether she owns any pets is unreasonable; (2) the probation condition requiring her to submit to and cooperate in field interrogations infringes upon her Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and is unconstitutionally overbroad; and (3) the probation condition requiring her to carry a copy of her probation conditions upon her person at all times and to offer the conditions to law enforcement upon contact is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Case No. FSB053053
On November 12, 2005, a police officer on routine patrol observed a car driven by defendant commit several traffic violations and then pull into a driveway and stop. The officer pulled up and initiated a traffic stop. When the officer contacted defendant, she identified herself but did not possess any identification. She said that she had borrowed the car from a friend. The officer observed that defendant exhibited symptoms of being under the influence of drugs. Defendant admitted using methamphetamine two hours earlier. A check of the car's registration indicated the car was stolen. Defendant was subsequently arrested.
On November 15, 2005, a complaint was filed charging defendant with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)); driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)).
B. Case No. FSB053860
On January 9, 2006, police officers were dispatched to San Manuel Indian Casino in response to a report of two persons trespassing. Casino security contacted defendant, who was asleep in a chair in front of a slot machine. Defendant had earlier been ejected from the casino and told she could no longer enter the casino. She was accompanied by a male who became argumentative when casino security asked him to wait in the lobby. The male was detained and found to be in possession of a flathead screwdriver. The male claimed he was a gang member and carried the screwdriver for protection.
Defendant was detained in the security office for trespassing; she was placed on a chair in the office, which was searched prior to her sitting in it. As a San Bernardino County Sheriff deputy finished citing defendant, the chair she had been sitting in was searched again, and a large baggie containing smaller baggies of methamphetamine was found. Defendant denied knowledge regarding the baggie of methamphetamine but admitted to using methamphetamine the previous two days. Defendant was not arrested due to the fact that she was pregnant.
On January 12, 2006, a complaint was filed charging defendant with possession of a controlled substance for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.)
A. Pet Condition
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the term "pets" in probation condition No. 7 as unconstitutional and overbroad. The court denied that request.
Condition No. 7 specifically provides in pertinent part that defendant "[k]eep the probation officer informed of place of residence, cohabitants and pets, and give written notice to the probation officer twenty-four (24) hours prior to any changes. . . . " (Italics added.)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to strike the pet condition because the condition is not reasonably related to her crime or future criminality, it limits her fundamental rights, and is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree.3
"The primary goal of probation is to ensure `[t]he safety of the public . . . through the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation.' [Citation.] [C]onditions of probation `are routinely imposed when the sentencing court determines, in an exercise of its discretion, that a defendant who is statutorily eligible for probation is also suitable to receive it.' [Citation.] In the granting of probation, the Legislature has declared the primary considerations to be: `the nature of the offense; the interests of justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant.' [Citation.] [¶] In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. [Citations.] `The court may impose and require . . . [such] reasonable conditions as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.' [Citation.] The trial court's discretion, although broad, nevertheless is not without limits: a condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute. In addition, . . . Penal Code section 1203.1 . . . require[s] that probation conditions which regulate conduct `not itself criminal' be `reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.' [Citation.]" (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120-1121; see also § 1203.1; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233; People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 682-683.)
While pet ownership is not, in itself, criminal, it is reasonably related to the supervision of a probationer, and hence to her future criminality.
"`[C]onditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and "reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], quoting People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 879, quoting People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 768 (dis. opn. of Peters, J.).) However, there is no constitutional right to keep a pet. (See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 388.) A fortiori, there is no constitutional right to keep a pet without telling your probation officer.4
Absent any such constitutional concerns, "[a]n adult probation condition is unreasonable if `it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Byron B., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016, quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted, quoting People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627.) "As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing court violates this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or `"`exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121, quoting People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 234, quoting People v. Warner, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 683, quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72.)
"[Probation conditions] are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large. [Citation.] These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. Recent research suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, [citation], and the importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes, [citation]." (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 875 [97 L.Ed.2d 709, 107 S.Ct. 3164].) A probation condition therefore may be deemed reasonable if it "enable[s] the [probation] department to supervise compliance with the specific conditions of probation." (People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240.)
A probation officer may need to visit a probationer's home unannounced. Here, for example, defendant's probation conditions required her to "[s]ubmit to a search . . . of your . . . residence . . . at any time of the day or night . . . ." Knowing, in advance, what animals are in the probationer's home is reasonably related to the safety of the probation officer.
While some pets are so innocuous that they could not possibly interfere with a probation officer's performance of his or her duties, it is perfectly reasonable for the trial court not to be more specific as to species, breed, or temperament. Animals can be unpredictable, particularly when confronted by a stranger in what they consider to be their own territory. Ask any letter carrier. Or ask any professional animal trainer -- they have a saying: "[A]nything with a mouth bites." (Sutherland, Kicked, Bitten and Scratched (2006) p. 63.)
It can hardly be questioned that certain pets, especially dogs, can pose a great hazard and/or life-threatening danger to others. In fact, both statutory law and case law routinely address the notable problems presented by dogs, dog bites, and poor dog-owner/handler control. (See, e.g., People v. Henderson (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 453, 461; Pen. Code, § 399 [mischievous animal causing death or serious bodily injury]; Pen. Code, § 597.5 [felonious possession of fighting dogs]; Civ. Code, § 3342 [dog bites; strict liability of owner].) Dangerous pets can also include venomous reptiles or spiders, pigs, and/or potentially any animal faced with a stranger in its territory.
Moreover, a probation officer is entitled to some protection against undue surprise. A trial court drafting probation conditions in the abstract might not think to include a parrot among the pets that must be disclosed; presumably, however, a probation officer would appreciate being warned that that voice in another room may just be a bird. Likewise, any probation officer who has to open a closet or reach under a bed during a search would no doubt like to know ahead of time whether the probationer keeps snakes -- regardless of whether the snakes are venomous.
Even assuming the challenged condition could have been more narrowly tailored, that does not render it invalid; rather, it simply must not exceed the bounds of reason. It is not unreasonable to put the burden on the probationer to tell the probation officer what animals may be present. The probation officer can then decide what precautions to take. The challenged condition does not prevent the probationer from owning a pet of any kind. It does not even require approval of the pet! It simply requires notice to the probation officer. This is amply within the bounds of reason.
The interpretation of "pets" is a case of first impression but should be analyzed using the same standards as that used to approve notification of "cohabitants," which is also included in condition No. 7. Notification of "cohabitants" is imposed in order to ascertain whether the probationer is associating with people who would negatively affect his rehabilitation. (See People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 622-626 [holding that a condition forbidding contact with gang members was necessary to rehabilitation and future criminality].) For example, a defendant convicted of drug possession should not live with drug users or dealers. The purpose of notification about pets is similar: (1) to assure proper rehabilitation of defendant, and (2) to protect the probation officer. We believe knowledge of pets is a prerequisite to the search condition, which ensures that defendant is complying with her sentence and is not reoffending. (See People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 610 [holding that probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers].) The implied power of the probation officer regarding both cohabitants and pets is also the same: Notification of pets implies a probation officer's authorization to exclude certain pets or direct the care of the pets (i.e. keeping them contained) in order to allow searches. Again, this does not authorize capricious exclusions but allows directives that further the rehabilitation of defendant.Significantly, defendant does not challenge the portion of the probation condition that required her to keep the probation officer informed of her cohabitants. This condition serves the salutary, rehabilitative purpose of preventing defendant from associating with those who might lead him into criminal behavior. Defendant does not seem to think this condition had to be more narrowly drawn so as to require defendant to report only cohabitants who are gang members, drug users, or known felons. It is just as reasonable to require defendant to report all of her pets as it is to require her to report all of her cohabitants. Condition No. 7 is valid, as it protects the probation officer and allows him or her to oversee defendant for future criminality.
B. Field Interrogation Condition
At sentencing, defense counsel also objected to the probation condition that requires defendant to "[s]ubmit to and cooperate in a field interrogation by any peace officer at any time of the day or night," as "unconstitutional and overbroad." The court denied the request to strike this condition.
Defendant contends on appeal that probation condition No. 20 is unreasonable, violates her constitutional privilege against self- incrimination, and is overbroad and vague. We disagree.
As described, ante, trial courts have broad discretion in determining what conditions of probation will aid the reformation and rehabilitation of the defendant. (§ 1203.1; People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1120-1121.) Again, a condition will not be held invalid unless it has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant is convicted, relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) All three factors must be present for a condition of probation to be invalid. (People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 366.)
Defendant's concern that the field interrogation condition is overly broad and serves no legitimate purpose is not well founded. Like the standard probation search condition, a field interrogation probation condition is a correctional tool that can be used to determine whether the defendant is complying with the terms of his or her probation or disobeying the law. (See People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752 [purpose of an unexpected search is to determine not only whether parolee disobeys the law, a basic condition of parole, but also whether he or she obeys the law; the condition helps measure the effectiveness of parole supervision]; In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006 [probation is an alternative form of punishment, carrying with it certain burdens, such as a search term, which can be used as a correctional tool].)
This court observed in People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 705 that "a warrantless search condition is intended and does enable a probation officer `"to ascertain whether [the defendant] is complying with the terms of probation; to determine not only whether [the defendant] disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained . . . would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant and his amenability to rehabilitation."' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 712.) In addition, as our Supreme Court observed, "[w]hen [warrantless search and seizure] conditions are imposed upon a probationer . . . , it is established that the individual `consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term. Probation is not a right, but a privilege.' [Citation.]" (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1150, quoting People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 608.)
Likewise, here, the field interrogation probation condition will provide practical, on-the-street supervision to defendant. Field interrogations will be used to monitor defendant's compliance with conditions of her probation. Also, information obtained from field interrogations will provide a valuable measure of her amenability to rehabilitation, which is related to her future criminality. A condition allowing field interrogations may further dual purposes of deterring future offenses by the probationer and ascertaining whether she is complying with the terms of her probation. The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked field interrogation of defendant is to ascertain whether defendant is complying with the terms of probation -- to determine not only whether she disobeys the law, but also whether she obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th 743, 752.)
Although the field interrogation probation condition forbids defendant from doing something that is not in itself criminal, that is, "`ignore his [or her] interrogator and walk away'" (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 553 [100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497]), it is related to the purposes of probation as described in People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. It provides officers with a means of assessing defendant's progress toward rehabilitation, it assists them in enforcing other terms of her probation, and it deters further criminal activity. Thus, the field interrogation condition serves the purposes of probation and is valid under the Lent criteria. (Id. at p. 486.) In addition, implicit in almost every probation condition, including the field interrogation condition, is reasonableness.
Here, defendant committed the crimes of receiving a stolen vehicle, unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, being under the influence of alcohol, possessing a controlled substance for purpose of sale, and maintaining a place for the unlawful use of drugs. She was on a grant of felony probation at the time she committed the instant offense. In addition, she had a proclivity to commit drug-related crimes and had given false information to a police officer in the past. We believe the field interrogation condition is necessary to help reform defendant by discouraging her from repeatedly committing crimes or concealing future criminality and to ensure that defendant remains in compliance with probation. The field interrogation term is reasonably related to defendant's future criminality.
Additionally, "interrogation" inherently means questions related to "seek solution of a crime." (See Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 818, col. 2.) Thus the inherent meaning of the term limits the questions that could be asked of a probationer in a field interrogation to those designed to monitor the probationer's compliance with the other terms of his or her probation as well as future criminality. We do not find that the failure to make this limitation explicit provides any justification for striking the condition. It may be that this limitation is implicit in the language that the court adopted and could be permitted to stand without modifying the language of the condition. Moreover, as discussed in detail, post, it is unlikely that a probationer would likely be found to have violated the field interrogation term in a probation revocation hearing for merely refusing to answer questions unrelated to the conduct of the probationer. This condition would assist defendant in maintaining compliance with the law and the terms of her probation.
Again, even assuming the challenged condition could have been more narrowly tailored, that does not render it invalid; rather, it simply must not exceed the bounds of reason. The challenged condition will provide a means to monitor defendant's progress toward rehabilitation, and deter future criminality. This is amply within the bounds of reason.
Defendant claims the field interrogation condition implicates her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We find no constitutional violation.
Defendant is not an ordinary citizen. She is a convicted felon who has repeatedly been granted the privilege of probation. In fact, considering defendant's criminal record, defendant is quite lucky to be on probation. It has long been settled that certain constitutional rights can be limited where appropriate in the probation process. (See People v. Arvanites (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1063 [prohibition against planning and engaging in demonstrations was valid where the defendant falsely imprisoned a man during a protest rally]; In re Mannino (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 968-969 [probation condition prohibiting the defendant from active participation in demonstrations following his conviction of assault at a college demonstration was reasonable], overruled on other grounds in People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 237; People v. King (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 814, 822-823 [condition of probation proscribing participation in demonstrations valid where the defendant battered police officers at an antiwar demonstration].) Because of her status as a felon, defendant may be detained and questioned by a peace officer without the requirement that the officer have at least a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that defendant is engaged in criminal activity. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889].) Although an ordinary citizen "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his [or her] refusal to listen [to a peace officer] or answer [any question put to her] does not, without more, furnish those grounds[,]" we repeat that defendant is not an ordinary citizen. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498[103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229].) The impingement on her constitutional right to remain silent is warranted due to her status as a felon. The condition is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of the state and her reform and rehabilitation while merely requiring her to submit to and cooperate in a field interrogation. Defendant still retains her Fifth Amendment rights, as discussed below. Furthermore, any custodial interrogation that might follow a field interrogation would be subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694].
While probationers have long been required to "cooperate" with their probation officers, a probationer is not foreclosed from asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege, and it would not be inherently uncooperative for her to assert that privilege. (See United States v. Davis (1st Cir. 2001) 242 F.3d 49, 52 (Davis) [finding no realistic threat in a requirement to "cooperate" with the probation officer].) Therefore, although defendant must cooperate with the police, she retains the right to assert the Fifth Amendment, and her probation cannot be revoked based on a valid exercise of that right. (Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 427, 434 [104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409] (Murphy).) In Murphy, the Supreme Court explained that if a state attaches "[t]he threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege" against self-incrimination by asserting either "expressly or by implication . . . that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation . . . the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution." (Id. at p. 435.) However, defendant's probation condition contains no such threat. It would not be inherently uncooperative for defendant to assert the Fifth Amendment; defendant could still follow instructions and answer nonincriminating questions. (See Davis, at p. 52.) Therefore, although defendant must generally cooperate with the police, she retains the right to assert the Fifth Amendment, and her probation cannot be revoked based on a valid exercise of that right.
Furthermore, if the officer inquires into improper matters or otherwise acts improperly, defendant may present evidence at the probation violation hearing to show that the interrogation or conduct was arbitrary, capricious, harassing, or otherwise not reasonably related to the purposes for which she is on probation. (See In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 87, fn. 5, overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 131-139.) Similarly, the field interrogation condition does not allow law enforcement officials to awaken defendant "at any time or place." Rather, the challenged condition requires defendant to submit to and cooperate in a field interrogation -- the condition does not allow officers to barge into defendant's home and question her unnecessarily. Also, defendant may, when questioned, give a truthful answer, and her answer may be used at trial without offending the Fifth Amendment. Her obligation to answer questions truthfully is the same obligation borne by any witness at a trial or before a grand jury. (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 427.) It is not too onerous to require her, for purposes of rehabilitation and reform, to speak truthfully to an officer. Because she has a duty to answer an officer's questions truthfully, unless she asserts the privilege, it does not violate her privilege not to incriminate herself. The purpose of probation is, of course, defendant's reformation and rehabilitation, and speaking truthfully to a peace officer is arguably an implied condition of probation. (See People v. Cortez (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 839, 844.) Nevertheless, defendant is not required to give up her freedom to decline to answer particular questions. (Murphy, at p. 429.) The Constitution does not forbid the asking of incriminating questions (id. at p. 428), and the state in this case has neither expressly nor by implication threatened that invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege would lead to revocation of probation.
The defendant in People v. Miller (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1311, 1315, who was required to submit to polygraph testing at the direction of his probation officer as a condition of probation, also argued that the condition violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The Miller court stated: "Defendant misconstrues the nature of the privilege. The privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; it must be claimed. [Citation.] Although defendant has a duty to answer the polygraph examiner's questions truthfully, unless he invokes the privilege, shows a realistic threat of self-incrimination and nevertheless is required to answer, no violation of his right against self-incrimination is suffered. [Citation.] The mere requirement of taking the test in itself is insufficient to constitute an infringement of the privilege." (Ibid.)
Moreover, the field interrogation condition is less intrusive than some of the other conditions of defendant's probation that defendant does not challenge. For example, condition No. 9 requires defendant to "[s]ubmit to a search and seizure of [her] person, residence and/or property under [her] control at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause." (Italics added.) Condition No. 4 requires defendant to "[c]ooperate with the probation officer in a plan of rehabilitation and follow all reasonable directives of the probation officer." Condition No. 16 forbids defendant from associating "with known convicted felons or anyone actively engaged in criminal activity . . . ." Likewise, condition No. 17 prohibits defendant from associating "with known illegal users or sellers of controlled substances."
Defendant recognizes that under Murphy a probation condition which merely requires a probationer to be truthful does not violate a person's privilege against self-incrimination. (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 436.) The condition here is similar. The obligation to "cooperate" entails the general obligation to appear and to answer questions truthfully, just as in Murphy and Davis, supra, 242 F.3d 49. Defendant is constrained by the condition from doing something which is otherwise lawful, i.e., she may not simply "`ignore [her] interrogator and walk away'" (United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553), but it is integral to the purposes of probation as described in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. It provides officers with a means of assessing defendant's progress toward rehabilitation, it assists them in enforcing other terms of her probation, and it deters further criminal activity. Thus, the field interrogation condition serves the purposes of probation and is valid under the Lent criteria.
To the extent defendant relies on United States v. Saechao (9th Cir.2005) 418 F.3d 1073 (Saechao), that reliance is misplaced. In Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. 420, the United States Supreme Court held that the probation condition that a defendant "be truthful with his probation officer in all matters" was constitutional because it only proscribed false statements. (Id. at p. 436.) There was nothing in the probation condition that compelled the defendant to answer all questions; the defendant was only required to be truthful if he chose to answer his probation officer's questions. (Ibid.) In contrast, the probation condition in Saechao explicitly stated that the defendant must "`promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries'" during a field interrogation. (Saechao, at p. 1075, italics added.) The Ninth Circuit held that this probation condition was unconstitutional because, "[n]ot only was [the defendant] required to be truthful to his probation officers, but he was expressly required, under penalty of revocation, to `promptly . . . answer all reasonable inquiries.'" (Id. at p. 1078.) The court held that this condition violated the Fifth Amendment because, unlike the condition in Murphy, the probationer was not permitted to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination without jeopardizing his supervised release. (Saechao, at p. 1078.)
Here, defendant is not subject to a condition like the one found impermissible in Saechao requiring her to answer all reasonable inquiries; she is subject to a condition like the one found permissible in Murphy, bearing the implied general obligation to be truthful in her answers. If asked a question the answer to which is likely to incriminate her, she is free to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to respond.
Additionally, as explained above, "interrogation" inherently means questions related to "seek solution of [a] crime." (See Black's Law Dict., supra, p. 818, col. 2.) Thus, the inherent meaning of the term limits the questions that could be asked of a probationer in a field interrogation to those designed to monitor the probationer's compliance with the other terms of his probation, i.e., future criminality. We do not find that the failure to make this limitation explicit provides any justification for striking the condition. This limitation is implicit in the language of the probation condition, and may stand without modifying the language of the condition. Moreover, pursuant to this decision, we hold that a probationer may not be found to have violated the field interrogation term in a probation revocation hearing for merely refusing to answer questions, where those questions are unrelated to the conduct of the probationer.
In summary, we note that the limitation on defendant's liberty is warranted due to her status as a felon. The condition is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of the state -- her reform and rehabilitation -- while requiring her merely to submit to and cooperate in a field interrogation. Any custodial interrogation that might follow a field interrogation would be subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436. In these circumstances, we conclude that the condition is reasonable and constitutional.
C. Condition Requiring Defendant to Carry a Copy of Her Conditions on Her Person at All Times
At sentencing, defense counsel also objected to the probation condition that requires defendant to "[c]arry a copy of [her] terms and conditions of probation on [her] person at all times, and offer them to any peace officer upon contact," as "unconstitutional" and "over burdensome." The court denied the request to strike this condition. Counsel thereafter inquired whether the condition applied when defendant was taking a shower, or when she was in bed sleeping, or when she went to the sidewalk to get her mail. The court noted, "[W]e don't do ridiculous things" and stated, "[I]t's a reasonable term to be imposed and you use reasonable thinking when you apply it. She's not going to carry them around the house with her while she's inside." Counsel then pointed out that the condition stated "at all times." The court replied, "That's fine. But we put reasonable readings on everything, counsel."
Defendant asserts that this condition is unrelated to her crime or to future criminality, and is overboard and vague. We disagree. As with the search and field interrogation conditions, this condition assists in defendant's rehabilitation by first notifying law enforcement officers with whom she comes into contact of the terms of her probation so that they can then determine whether she is in compliance. We do not view this condition as particularly onerous, in that defendant can easily keep a copy of the conditions in the same place as other important identifying documents, such as a driver's license. Neither do we give any credence to defendant's concern that her probation could be violated if she did not have a copy of the terms within reach while she was taking a shower or was inside her home, in that the solution would be for her to simply go to wherever her wallet is located and produce the conditions.
As stated previously, ante, II.B., and as pointed out by the trial court, implicit in every probation condition, including this condition, is reasonableness. Again, even assuming the challenged condition could have been more narrowly tailored, that does not render it invalid; rather, it simply must not exceed the bounds of reason. As with the other terms of probation, we believe the condition is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of the state -- her reform and rehabilitation -- while requiring her merely to carry a copy of her conditions on her person.
Thus, the trial court did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it imposed condition No. 23, and it is not unconstitutional.
The judgment is affirmed.
McKINSTER Acting P.J.
KING, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority as it relates to the probation condition requiring defendant to carry a copy of her probation conditions upon her person at all times. I dissent, however, as it relates to the condition requiring defendant to keep the probation officer informed of whether she owns any pets and the condition requiring her to submit and cooperate in field interrogations. I believe both of these conditions are overbroad.
Trial courts have broad discretion to set conditions of probation in order to "foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1." (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120; see Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) "If it serves these dual purposes, a probation condition may impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is `not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.' [Citation.]" (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624.)
However, the trial court's discretion in setting the conditions of probation is not unbounded. "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it `(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' [Citation.]" (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) A condition of probation must satisfy all three requirements before it may be declared invalid. (People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 365-366.)
The pet probation condition here violates all three criteria set forth in Lent.
First, defendant's ownership or contact with a pet of any kind has nothing to do with the crime of which he was convicted. Here, defendant pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon. There is no indication in the record that a pet was present at the time of the crime or had anything to do with defendant's actions.
Second, having a pet is not in itself criminal.
Third, pet ownership, of itself, is not indicative of or related to future criminality. Defendant did not commit any crime relating to ownership of or access to any animals and there is no basis upon which to anticipate that defendant would commit such a crime in the future.
The People contend the condition is valid because it is reasonably related to future criminality. The argument on the point is that the probation condition at issue helps insure that a probation officer can safely conduct his supervisory visits at defendant's residence. As a pet itself can be a weapon, knowledge of any pets in defendant's residence can be crucial to insuring a probation officer's safety in supervising defendant's compliance with the other conditions of probation.
The concern, it appears, is whether defendant might have a dangerous animal at his residence. Knowing whether a defendant keeps dangerous animals as pets would assist an officer when conducting a search of a probationer's residence for probation violations such as being in the possession of weapons or drugs.
The purpose of officer safety, to permit the probation officer to reasonably supervise defendant so as to prevent future criminality by conducting visits to the residence or probation searches without interference from dangerous animals, is not met by the condition imposed. Stated another way, the pet probation condition here is overbroad and not reasonably tailored to meet the objective for which it has been imposed.
To the extent there exists a legitimate and justifiable concern as to the safety of individuals conducting a probation search, the condition must be narrowed to deal with dogs and/or animals which pose a foreseeable risk of injury to persons entering the premises.
Two cases mention a condition of parole (not probation) involving pets, where the condition is related to officer safety. United States v. Crew (D.Utah 2004) 345 F.Supp.2d 1264 refers to a defendant's release on parole, including as a parole condition: "4. HOME VISITS: I will permit visits to my place of residence by agents of Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my parole. I will not interfere with [this] requirement, i.e. having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door, etc." United States v. Pyeatt (D.Utah, June 15, 2006, 2:05-CR-890 TC) 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 40337 referred to an identical parole condition.
The genuine concern to be addressed by the probation condition, as suggested by the parole conditions in Crew and Pyeatt, is whether a probation officer making a home visit or conducting a probation search will be able to do so without being at risk from a dangerous animal, such as a vicious dog. The probation condition here is not tailored to meet that objective, or the objective of allowing the officer to approach the residence unannounced. "A probation condition is constitutionally overbroad when it substantially limits a person's rights and those limitations are not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition." (People v. Harrisson (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 637, 641, citing In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 146 ["`. . . The Constitution, the statute, all case law, demand and authorize only "reasonable" conditions, not just conditions "reasonably related" to the crime committed.' [Citation.] [¶] Careful scrutiny of an unusual and severe probation condition is appropriate [citation]."].) "[C]onditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and `reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation . . . .' [Citation.]" (People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 879.) To the extent that the generic "pets" condition here is not tailored to meet that legitimate objective, it is not related to defendant's offense or to his future criminality. It therefore fails to meet the test of reasonableness under Lent and is invalid.
The present condition relating to all pets without limitation is overbroad.
I would therefore remand the case to modify probation condition No. 7 to strike the reference to pets in general but to add a new condition narrowed to deal with dogs and/or animals which pose a foreseeable risk of injury to persons entering the premises. Term 20 of the probation conditions should be limited to allow field interrogation of the probationer only as it relates to the probationer's criminality and compliance with the other terms and conditions of probation.
Term 20 provides: "Submit to and cooperate in a field interrogation by any peace officer at any time of the day or night."
I believe the provision is overbroad. The general propriety of such a term has been recognized. (See Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420 [104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409].) It must nonetheless be tailored, so that it is reasonably related to the crime of which defendant was convicted, or to defendant's future criminality. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121; Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321.)
By its provision, term 20 allows for the probationer to be interrogated as to any subject matter, whether related or unrelated to the conduct of the probationer.
1. All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2. The factual background is taken from the probation officer's report.
3. We note that this issue is currently pending before the Supreme Court. (People v. Olguin (Dec. 15, 2006, E039342) review granted Mar. 21, 2007, S149303; People v. Lopez (Nov. 30, 2006, E039251) review granted Mar. 21, 2007, S149364.)
4. Arguably, if keeping the pet was, in itself, a crime, such a requirement might violate the right against self- incrimination. This, however, is not the thrust of defendant's argument.