Judgment, Supreme Court (Bernard J. Fried, J.) rendered September 12, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (2 counts) and criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree, and sentencing him as a predicate felony offender to concurrent terms of 3 1/2 to 7, and 2 to 4 years, and, upon his guilty plea, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, sentencing him to a term of 10 1/2 years to life, to run consecutive to the above sentence, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant was at the center of independent State and Federal investigations into a substantial drug and weapons organization. The search of defendant's apartment was pursuant to a validly executed search warrant. Since the more onerous requirements of a search warrant had been satisfied, there was no constitutional infirmity in the failure to also secure a warrant of arrest (see, Jones v City and County of Denver, 854 F2d 1206, 1209). Nor did the court err in examining the affidavits in support of the warrant application ex parte and in camera, and in denying to defendant disclosure of the identities of informants (People v Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578, 592 N.Y.S.2d 945, 607 N.E.2d 1050, cert denied 113 S Ct 1854, 123 L. Ed. 2d 477). Defendant's contention that it was error for the court to have denied his request for a charge on the defense of agency is without merit. Within the parameters established by People v Argibay (45 N.Y.2d 45, 54, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664, 379 N.E.2d 191, cert denied sub nom Hahn-DiGuiseppe v. New York, 439 U.S. 930), People v Lam Lek Chong (45 N.Y.2d 64, 76, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200, cert denied 439 U.S. 935), and People v Roche (45 N.Y.2d 78, 86, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682, 379 N.E.2d 208, cert denied 439 U.S. 958), there was no reasonable view of the evidence which would have supported submission of a defense of agency.
We have examined defendant's remaining points. Several are unpreserved; all are without merit.
ENTERED: October 28, 1993