In these two joint appeals, the plaintiffs, Norfolk and Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Norfolk) and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company (Liberty), appeal 1 from the judgments of the trial court denying their applications to vacate an uninsured motorist arbitration award and granting the applications of the defendant, Craig Wysocki, to confirm the award. The cases were presented to the trial court on the following stipulated facts.
In October, 1989, the defendant was operating an all-terrain vehicle, which he owned, on a public road when he collided with another all-terrain vehicle owned and operated by Hans Pedersen. Both all-terrain vehicles were uninsured. The defendant was also the owner of a private passenger motor vehicle that was insured by Liberty for uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $20,000. He was also insured under a private passenger motor vehicle policy issued to his mother by Norfolk that provided uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $40,000. The defendant made uninsured motorist claims against both policies, and a panel of arbitrators awarded him $60,000.
Liberty and Norfolk filed applications to vacate the award, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418, 2 and the
trial court denied the applications to vacate and granted the defendant's applications to confirm the award. Liberty and Norfolk each claim that: (1) Pedersen's all-terrain vehicle was not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of their respective policies; and (2) even if the all-terrain vehicle was a "motor vehicle," it was not covered for uninsured motorist coverage because of the terms of a certain exclusion in each of their respective policies. The trial court concluded that although an all-terrain vehicle does not meet the statutory definition of a motor vehicle, it does meet the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle found in both policies for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, and that the exclusion provisions of the policies does not bar coverage. See Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Wysocki, 45 Conn. Sup. 144, 150, 702 A.2d 675 (1996).
Our examination of the record on appeal, and the briefs and arguments of the parties, persuades us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Because the trial court's memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion therein contained. See Garrett's Appeal from Probate, 237 Conn. 233, 237-38, 676 A.2d 394 (1996).