Mallinckrodt LLC v. Littell

2008 | Cited 0 times | D. Maine | December 8, 2008


Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection and the Department itself from enforcing a clean-up order. To determine whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the Court applies the same four-factor analysis used to evaluate a motion for preliminary injunction. Northwest Bypass Group v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 453 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337 (D.N.H. 2006). Those well established factors are:

(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm [to the movant] if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the non-movant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and, (4) the effect (if any) of the court's ruling on the public interest.

Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004). As with a preliminary injunction, the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that these factors "weigh in its favor." Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003).

The Court has reviewed and considered the motion, and concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the potential for irreparable harm. Matos v. Clinton Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that irreparable harm is a "necessary threshold showing for awarding preliminary injunctive relief").

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Docket # 4) be and hereby is DENIED.


Back to top