CORBIN v. CHITWOOD

145 F. Supp.2d 92 (2001) | Cited 0 times | D. Maine | May 17, 2001

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This case pits privacy and other individual rights against acommunity's interest in knowing that a convicted sexual offender againstchildren is in its midst. I conclude that the police notification to thecommunity of the sexual offender's presence violated no constitutionalrights.

I. FACTS

The plaintiff, John Davies Corbin, is a convicted sex offender nowliving in Maine. Compl. ¶ 6. In 1986, he pleaded guilty inCalifornia to two counts of nonviolent lewd and lascivious acts withminors under the age of fourteen and one count of indecent exposure.Id.; Aff. of Det. Scott B. Dunham ¶ 5. (According to Corbin, hepleaded guilty to exposing his private parts while minors were in hisapartment and to touching the minors while they were clothed. Compl.¶ 6.) As a result of the conviction, Corbin was required to registeras a sex offender while residing in California. Corbin Aff. ¶ 12;Dunham Aff. ¶ 4. The California Violent Crime Information Center("VCIC") and the FBI's National Crime Information Center ("NCIC")maintain information concerning Corbin and his convictions. Compl.¶¶ 8-10; Dunham Aff. ¶¶ 4-5; Aff. of Portland Police ChiefMichael J. Chitwood ¶¶ 1-2.

On July 8, 1999, the Social Services Director at the Portland YMCAfiled a report alleging that on May 6, 1999, Corbin engaged ininappropriate sexual gestures and remarks in the public shower in thepresence of three minor boys. Dunham Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. A. (According toCorbin, hedid not make inappropriate sexual gestures. As for any remarks, he saysthe young boys were not offended. Corbin Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) An arrestwarrant was issued, charging the plaintiff with disorderly conduct for theincident. Corbin Aff. ¶ 6; Dunham Aff. ¶ 3; Chitwood Aff.¶ 3. On December 12, 2000, a criminal complaint for sexual aggressiontoward a child was filed against Corbin for the YMCA incident. CorbinAff. ¶ 7; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. B. This charge and thedisorderly conduct charge are currently pending in the Maine state courts.Corbin Aff. ¶ 7; Aff. of Attorney Peter Rodway (Corbin's defenselawyer in the state court proceedings) ¶¶ 2-4.

As a result of the arrest warrant for disorderly conduct, two Portlandpolice officers located Corbin at his Maine residence, 263 CumberlandAvenue in Portland. Dunham Aff. ¶ 6; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4. Thisresidence is in close proximity to the Portland Boys and Girls Club andPortland High School. Corbin Aff. ¶ 16; Dunham Aff. ¶ 8;Chitwood Aff. ¶ 5. The officers spoke with Corbin and informed himof the outstanding warrant. Dunham Aff. ¶ 6; Chitwood Aff. ¶4. They stepped into his apartment while Corbin put on his shoes andprepared to go with them. Dunham Aff. ¶ 6; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4.While the officers were inside the apartment, they observed on Corbin'scomputer screen an image of two boys (the age of the pictured boys isdisputed; Corbin states they were clearly fourteen, Corbin Aff. ¶8; the officers say six or seven, Dunham Aff. ¶ 6) pulling downtheir underwear to expose their backsides. Dunham Aff. ¶ 6. Theofficers thereafter obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peaceto search for sexually explicit materials, including photographs andcomputer images. Rodway Aff. ¶ 5; Dunham Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; ChitwoodAff. ¶ 4.

Police officers executed the search warrant and seized Corbin'scomputer, some floppy disks, a camera and undeveloped film. Dunham Aff.¶ 7. On this record, I cannot determine what the materialscontained. Corbin denies there was any "kiddie porn." Corbin Aff.¶ 9. The police say only that a "review of images stored on thecomputer showed images of young boys, some in positions and/or acts bestdescribed as `sexually explicit.'" Dunham Aff. ¶ 7. Corbin has nowbeen charged in state court with possessing sexually explicit materials.Corbin Aff. ¶ 11; Dunham Aff. ¶ 7; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4.

Detective Dunham contacted Cathy Okubo, a criminal intelligencespecialist with the State of California's Department of Justice. DunhamAff. ¶ 4. Okubo provided the Portland Police Department with a copyof Corbin's registry file kept by the VCIC. Dunham Aff. ¶ 4, Ex.B. Okubo stated that Corbin was not in violation of the California sexregistration law; that California recognizes Corbin as a mentallydisordered sex offender; and that the Sexual Habitual Offender Program("SHOP") has identified Corbin as "high risk." Dunham Aff., Ex. B.Corbin's records from VCIC state that he is a serious sex offender forthe purposes of Megan's Law (a sexual offender registry and communitynotification law prompted by the rape and murder of seven-year-old MeganKanka by a convicted sex offender). Id. The records describe Corbin'soffenses of conviction as "crimes against children/lewd or lascivious,""commitment (90 days) as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO),""oral copulation" and "indecent exposure." Id. The records also containsdetailed descriptions of the offenses. Id.

Based on this information and the pending criminal charges againstCorbin, the Portland Police Department determined that Corbin'sactivities constituted a publicsafety problem. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; Dunham Aff. ¶ 9; Chitwood Aff.¶ 6. On November 29, 2000, in the area of Corbin's Cumberland Avenueresidence, they distributed a Neighborhood Policing Bulletin, identifyingCorbin and including a photograph. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; Dunham Aff.¶ 9, Ex. D; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 6. The Bulletin revealed Corbin'sdate of birth, height, weight, physical description and home address.Dunham Aff., Ex. D. It stated that:

John Corbin has been convicted of various child sexual crimes in California starting in 1980, which include Child Sexual Misconduct, Indecent Exposure and Oral Copulation. Corbin registered as a sex offender with the State of California in 1995. The State of California recognizes Corbin as a sex offender. The California Sexual Habitual Offender Program (SHOP) has identified Corbin as a "High Risk." Corbin's victims have been young males. Corbin is not to have contact with anyone under 17 years of age.

Dunham Aff., Ex. D (emphasis in original). Local news media covered thenotification, and Chief Chitwood responded to questions concerning Corbinand why he was considered a public safety risk. Corbin Decl. ¶ 3;Compl. ¶¶ 3, 16-17; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 6.

Corbin disputes much of the information contained in the NeighborhoodPolicing Bulletin and the information in the VCIC. He states that henever used drugs or threats of force to coerce sexual contact with boys.Corbin Aff. ¶ 1. He claims that he did not perform oralcopulation. Id. ¶ 2. He also denies that he is currentlyclassified by California as a MDSO. Id. ¶ 14. He also claims thatthe California state courts invalidated a number of his sex offenseconvictions. Id. ¶¶ 4, 14, 15.

II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Corbin seeks a temporary restraining order1 to prevent thedefendants, the Chief of the Portland Police Department, the City ofPortland and unnamed police officers and employees of the City, from anyfurther community notification of his prior criminal record and homeaddress. Corbin wants to prevent the defendants from repeating theNovember 29, 2000 publicity event at any new residence he establishes.Corbin claims that: (1) the defendants' distribution of a flyercontaining his address and arrest record violates his constitutionalright to privacy; (2) the community notification subjects him to anunconstitutional ex post facto law; and (3) the defendants violate hissubstantive and procedural due process rights in not giving him noticeand a hearing concerning the public notification before it occurs.2

III. ANALYSIS

In considering an application for a temporary restraining order orpreliminary injunctive relief, this court must weigh the (1) thelikelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparableharm to the person seeking relief; (3) the balance of the hardship ifrelief is denied versus the other party's hardship if relief is granted;and (4) the effect of the decision on the public interest. PhilipMorris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1998);Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12,15 (1st Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bishop,839 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.Me. 1993). Likelihood of success on the merits isthe most important factor in the analysis, see Philip Morris, 159 F.3dat 674; Ross-Simmons, 102 F.3d at 16. Because I conclude that Corbin hasno likelihood of success on the merits, his motion is DENIED.

A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy

Corbin argues that the defendants violated his constitutional right toprivacy by distributing information about him on a flyer. Specifically,Corbin argues that the defendants violated his privacy rights by (1)disclosing his criminal record from California; (2) notifying thecommunity about this information in a sensationalist and inflammatorymanner; (3) disclosing false and inaccurate material in the flyer; and(4) disclosing his home address.

(1) Disclosure Alone

Based on the current record, I conclude that the Portland PoliceDepartment was entitled to view Corbin's criminal history information.Both the FBI's National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") and theCalifornia Violent Crime Information Center ("VCIC") permit disclosure ofan individual's criminal record to law enforcement agencies. See28 U.S.C.A. § 534(a)(4) (West 1993) ("The Attorney General shall— (4) exchange such records and information with, and for theofficial use of, the authorized officials of the Federal Government, theStates, cities and penal and other institutions"); Cal. Penal Code §11105(c)(7) (West 2000) ("The Attorney General may furnish state summarycriminal history information upon a showing of a compelling need to anyof the following . . .: (7) Peace Officers of the United States, otherstates. . . ."). Corbin argues that the Portland Police Department wasnot entitled to make this information public. See 28 U.S.C.A. §534(b) ("The exchange of records and information authorized by subsection(a)(4) of this section is subject to cancellation if dissemination ismade outside of the receiving department or related agencies."); Cal.Penal Code § 11142 (West 2000) ("Any person authorized by law toreceive a record or information obtained from a record who knowinglyfurnishes the record or information to a person who is not authorized bylaw to receive the record or information is guilty of a misdemeanor.").Corbin, however, does not allege that the Portland Police Departmentdisclosed the information from the NCIC. Compl. ¶ 11. Therefore,the only question is whether the Portland Police Department was entitledto disclose the information from the VCIC.

First, the nondisclosure provisions of California law cannot protectCorbin once his criminal history information left the state ofCalifornia. A state's statutes, regulations and policies cannot operateoutside of its borders and impose duties on other states. See, e.g., BMWof Am., Inc v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) (noting that "no singleState could . . . even impose its own policy choice on neighboringStates"); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State doesnot acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of anotherState merely because the welfare and health of its citizens may beaffected when they travel to that State"); New York Life Ins. Co. v.Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit thestatutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of thatState . . .").

Second, even if California law did apply, Corbin received the communitynotificationprotections provided by California law. See Cal. Penal Code§ 290(m) (West 2000). Under California Penal Code § 290(m), alaw enforcement agency is entitled to disclose the name, current addressand other personal information of a sex offender to any "communitymembers at risk," if a police officer "reasonably suspects" that a child"may be at risk" and determines that the community is likely to encounterthe sex offender. Id. In this case, it was objectively reasonable forthe Portland Police Department to conclude that children in the Portlandcommunity might be at risk from Corbin. Id. Criminal charges werepending against Corbin for sexual aggression towards a minor andpossession of sexually explicit materials. Corbin Aff. ¶¶ 7, 11;Dunham Aff. ¶ 7; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4, Exs. A & B. In addition,the Portland YMCA filed a complaint against Corbin for allegedly makingsexually inappropriate remarks and gestures to three young boys. DunhamAff. ¶ 2, Ex. A. Corbin resided near the Portland Boys and GirlsClub, Portland High School, and the Portland YMCA. Corbin Aff. ¶16. It was likely, therefore, that children would encounter Corbin.Cal. Penal Code § 290(m)(6)(A) ("likely to encounter" means that "theagencies, organizations or other community members are in a location orin close proximity to a location where the offender lives. . . .").Therefore, even under California law and its protections, the PortlandPolice Department was entitled to disclose the relevant VCIC informationto the community.

Third, whether the Portland Police Department had authority underCalifornia law to disclose Corbin's criminal record is ultimatelyirrelevant to whether he had a constitutional right to privacy in theinformation. The release of the information, even if a statutoryviolation, simply does not rise to the level of a constitutionalviolation. In United States Department of Justice v. ReportersCommittee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775 (1989), the UnitedStates Supreme Court determined that release of a criminal defendant's"rap sheet" constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy under theFreedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). But the Supreme Court was carefulto state that the disclosure constituted only an invasion of privacyunder the FOIA, not the Constitution: "The question of the statutorymeaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as thequestion . . . [whether] an individual's interest in privacy is protectedunder the Constitution." Id. at 761 n. 13. In fact, the right toprivacy under the Constitution is substantially narrower than under theFOIA. The First Circuit has stated that the right of confidentialityunder the Constitution does not extend "beyond prohibiting profligatedisclosure of medical, financial, and other intimately personal data."Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 183 (1st Cir.1997). Corbin's arrest records do not fit those categories. See Paulv. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713-14 (1976) (public identification of someoneas an "active shoplifter" based upon an arrest record does not violateconstitutional right to privacy).

(2) Sensational and Inflammatory Manner of Disclosure

Corbin asserts that the sensationalism of the notification, includingthe presence of the media, and Chief Chitwood's allegedly inflammatoryremarks amounted to a greater invasion of privacy than if the factualinformation had been published "prosaically . . . and without fanfare."Application for T.R.O. and for Order to Show Cause Re: Prelim. Inj. at14. But his argument is based upon Chief Chitwood's"project[ing] the false inference that plaintiff was extremely unstable andlikely to reoffend," id., and proceeds to argue the reputation interest.I deal with the reputational argument in the next section. Corbin does nototherwise develop his bald assertion that disclosure of information thatconstitutionally can be made public may nevertheless invade aconstitutional privacy right because of the manner in which it wasdisseminated, and provides no authority for the assertion. I thereforedo not consider it further.

(3) False and Inaccurate Disclosure

Corbin's assertions that there are inaccuracies in the VCIC record andthe flyer do not change the privacy analysis. If something is notprivate to start with, getting it wrong does not make it private. (It maymake it defamatory.) Corbin may have recourse in California to disputethe accuracy of his criminal history and may be able to contest whetherit should have been disclosed by California authorities. See CentralValley Ch. Of the 7th Step Found., Inc. v. Younger, 214 Cal.App.3d 145,164 (Ct.App. 1989) (noting that the Department of Justice "must exercisegreat care" with criminal history information because of "inaccurate orincomplete arrest records, and dissemination of criminal records outsidethe criminal justice system"). In addition, he may be able to argue thatthe Portland police defendants defamed him by the publication of falseinformation. None of these claims, however, provides Corbin with a rightof recourse for invasion of privacy under the Constitution. Paul v.Davis, 424 U.S. at 713 (no constitutional privacy interest in avoidingdefamation).

(4) Disclosure of Home Address

Corbin also argues that a person has a privacy interest in limiting orcontrolling disclosure of his or her home address.3 First Circuitcaselaw on the right to privacy, however, permits the defendants todistribute the plaintiff's home address. See Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at182-83 (constitutional privacy interest limited to medical, financial andother intimately personal data); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 840-43(1st Cir. 1987). A home address has not been identified as "intimatelypersonal data" that warrants constitutional privacy protection.4

Therefore, the community notification did not violate Corbin'sconstitutional right to privacy.

B. Ex Post Facto

Corbin argues that the community notification constituted additionalpunishment for the California sex offenses he committed and therebyviolated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const.,art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex postfacto Law."). The ex post facto clause prevents the state ormunicipalities from passing "laws," "which make[] more burdensome thepunishment for a crime, after its commission. . . ." Hamm v. Latessa,72 F.3d 947, 956 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Beazall v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,169-70 (1925)).

The ex post facto clause is directed against all legislative acts,"whether it be a constitution, a constitutional amendment, an enactmentof the legislature, a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation, ora regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the stateexercising delegated legislative authority." Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150,163 (1913). There is nothing on the present record to suggest that thenotification here was part of a binding administrative regulation orpolicy that should be treated as a "law." See Hamm, 72 F.3d at 956 n. 14(noting that "the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whetheran administrative policy or regulations can be an ex post facto law").Corbin merely alleges that "Defendant City [of Portland] has an unwrittenpolicy and custom of performing community notification against allconvicted sex offenders residing in the city of Portland, regardless ofhow long ago their offenses were committed. . . ." Compl. ¶ 4. Onthe facts before me, the notification by the defendants at the mostarises from a policy that "serve[s] merely as guidelines fordiscretionary decisionmaking." That is insufficient to rise to an expost facto violation. Hamm, 72 F.3d at 956 n. 14.

Moreover, there is no ex post facto violation because the notificationdoes not punish Corbin. See, e.g., Roe v. Office of Adult Prob.,125 F.3d 47, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Connecticut probationoffice policy that notifies community of sex offender parolees does notconstitute punishment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9thCir. 1997) (holding that Washington sex offender registry does notconstitute punishment); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that community notification in New Jersey's sex offenderlaw does not constitute punishment); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425,434-35 (D.Mass. 1996) (denying a preliminary injunction because it wasunlikely that the party seeking relief would succeed in showing thatMassachusetts sex offender notification constitutes punishment). Corbinhas not shown that the notification program is punitive (the recordindicates that it was used in the interests of public safety), see Kansasv. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997) (requiring clear proof ofpunitive purpose); or that the punitive purpose or effect of thenotification was so great as to negate the remedial intent of thepolicy. See Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 434-35.

Therefore, the community notification did not violate the ex post factoprovision.

IV. DUE PROCESS

A. Substantive Due Process

Corbin argues that the community notification violated his substantivedueprocess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to recoverunder a substantive due process theory, Corbin must demonstrate eitherthat he was deprived of a specific liberty interest protected by theFourteenth Amendment, or that the defendants' conduct "shocks theconscience." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir.2000); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1stCir. 1995). The United States Supreme Court's decision in Paul v.Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), forecloses the first claim, based on aspecific liberty interest. According to the Supreme Court, substantivedue process applies only to rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit inthe concept of ordered liberty." There is no substantive due processright in preventing the publication of a person's arrest record; privacyrights include only those relating to marriage, contraception, familyrelationships, child rearing and education. Davis, 424 U.S. at 713(finding no violation in notifying community that someone is an "activeshoplifter" based upon arrest record). Corbin's claim does not fitwithin these categories.

Under the second theory, that the defendants' actions "shock theconscience," the plaintiff's substantive due process claim also fails.In order to shock the conscience, the defendants' action must have been"`egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking.'"Cruz-Erazo, 212 F.3d at 623 (citations omitted). The vast majority ofsuccessful cases involve a high degree of physical intrusiveness. SeeRochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that pumping acriminal defendant's stomach shocked the conscience); Harrington v.Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that reasonablefactfinder could find that forcing a police officer who was charged withchild abuse to undergo a physically intrusive test before returning towork shocked the conscience); Cf. Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. RhodeIsland Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (notingthat verbal-based substantive due process claims must be very egregiousto shock the conscience); Cruz-Erazo, 212 F.3d at 623 (holding thatverbal harassment by police officers did not shock the conscience becauseit was not physically intrusive or violent, nor did it strike at anyprotected relationship, such as between a parent and child); Souza v.Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecutor'sstatements to media linking the plaintiff to the murder of nine women didnot shock the conscience).

Here, the defendants' conduct did not involve any physical intrusion orviolence to Corbin. In addition, although the First Circuit has leftopen the possibility that verbal harassment or conduct in egregious casesmay shock the conscience, the facts presented here do not meet thatstandard. See Souza, 53 F.3d at 424-27 (refusing to apply the protectionto verbal harassment despite the prosecutor's statements to the mediaencouraging the linking of the plaintiff's son and nine murders);Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply theprotection to verbal harassment where a police officer stated "if we eversee your father on the streets again, you'll never see him again," andused vulgar language to two young children). The community notificationhere did not "strike at the basic fabric" of any protected relationshipor any basic right. Cruz-Erazo, 212 F.3d at 623.

As a result, Corbin's substantive due process claim fails.

B. Procedural Due Process

Corbin also argues that the defendants violated his right to proceduraldueprocess — i.e., notice and a hearing before the communitynotification occurred. In order for Corbin to be entitled to priornotice and a hearing, the defendants' disclosure must threaten a"liberty" interest. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 701; Borucki, 827 F.2d at842-43. I have already ruled that Corbin did not have a constitutionalprivacy interest in his identity, his address and his arrest/convictionrecord. Corbin claims that much of what was said about him wasoutrageously wrong. If so, he may have a state law claim for libel. TheSupreme Court has made very clear, however, that damage to reputation?thegist of Corbin's concerns?is simply not enough for federal constitutionalprotection.

The notification must infringe on reputation and in addition some moretangible interest, such as employment or alteration of legal status, tooccasion due process protection. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, 712; Borucki,827 F.2d at 842-843; see also Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 195(1st Cir. 1989) ("[R]eputational injury must coincide with some other`alteration of status'" (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 709-10)); Doe v.Pataki, 3 F. Supp.2d 456, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding a libertyinterest at stake where damage to reputation was coupled with burdensomeregistration requirements and added criminal liability). Corbin'scomplaint lacks the "something more" that would entitle him to proceduraldue process.5

V. CONCLUSION

I conclude that Corbin is highly unlikely to succeed on the merits ofhis claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting violations of his rightto privacy, right to be free from ex post facto laws and right tosubstantive and procedural due process. Therefore, his motion for atemporary restraining order is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

1. At a conference of counsel, Corbin asked that the issue be decidedon the papers without an evidentiary hearing.

2. Corbin also claims that the defendants lack statutory authority forwhat they did. That is a state law claim, not the basis for any federalconstitutional claim. If that is ultimately all that remains of Corbin'sclaim, I will dismiss it without prejudice under28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

3. In actuality, Corbin's privacy grievance is not the distribution ofhis address?addresses, after all, are widely available in print andonline directories. It is his address coupled with his identity as a sexoffender that disturbs him.

4. The First Circuit has dealt with home addresses under Freedom ofInformation Act and Federal Labor Relations Authority cases. Although itrecognizes a "discernible interest" in avoiding enforced disclosure ofone's address and rejects court decisions that find it "entirelynegligible," it nevertheless finds the privacy interest "relativelymodest." FLRA v. United States Dep't of Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 55-56 (1stCir. 1991). In such cases, it has "not hesitated in the past to allowdisclosure of names and addresses when there has been a strong publicinterest in favor of disclosure and when a significant privacy interestother than the release of the address was lacking." Aronson v. UnitedStates Dep't of HUD, 822 F.2d 182, 186 (1st Cir. 1987). Even a case(from another Circuit) that recognized a constitutional right to privacyin one's home address recognized that the community also has an "interestin knowing where prior sex offenders live so that susceptible individualscan be appropriately cautioned." See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396,404 (3d Cir. 1999). The court found the government's interest inpreventing sex offenses "compelling." Id. The same compelling interestexists here. Corbin allegedly made inappropriate sexual comments andgestures to three young boys in the recent past. Dunham Aff. ¶ 2,Ex. A. He is also charged with sexual aggression towards a minor andpossessing sexually explicit materials. Corbin Aff. ¶ 11; DunhamAff. ¶ 7; Chitwood Aff. ¶ 4, Exs. A & B. In addition, thePortland Police Department received information that Corbin was aregistered sexual offender. Dunham Aff., Ex. A. These factors amount toa compelling interest.

5. This lawsuit is not against California authorities. Thus, I neednot address whether a violation of statutory confidentiality by theCalifornia Department of Justice in inappropriately releasingconfidential information would satisfy the "something more" requirement.See Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp.2d 1032, 1036 (C.D.Cal.1998) (denying preliminary injunction on due process claim for lack ofliberty interest inasmuch as the California sex registry law"disseminates information that is available to the public becauseCalifornia's Public Records Act renders the [sex registry] information .. . a matter of public record").

Corbin is also not subject to Maine's Sex Offender Registration andNotification Act, 24-A M.R.S.A. § 11101, et seq., because he wasrequired to register in California for his sex offense more than tenyears ago. 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11225 ("[A] sex offender required toregister because the sex offender established a domicile in this statesubsequent to being declared a sex offender in another state . . . shallregister for a maximum of 10 years from the date when the sex offenderwas first required to register. . . ."). He therefore has no rights underthat statute.

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